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Environmental Impact of Oil on Water: A
Comparative Overview of the Law and
Policy in the United States and Nigeria
AMBROSE 0. 0. EKPU*
I. INTRODUCTION
Oil has been, and will probably remain in the foreseeable future, the
most important energy source in the world.' But its use has attendant
risks. Prominent among these risks is the environmental degradation as-
sociated with its production and use. Oil pollution ushered in by the pe-
troleum industry worldwide has been described as a necessary price for
cultural modernization and advancements in state infrastructure.2 The
task of controlling and minimizing the adverse impact of this inescapable
consequence of production, trans-portation, refinement, and use of oil
rests with municipal and international governments. Oil pollution affects
land, water, and air. However, the focus of this article is limited to the
impact of oil pollution on water, since it presents the most critical
problems in Nigeria.'
* LL.B. (1985), LL.M. (1989), Bendel State University (Nigeria). Fulbright Scholar at
the National Energy-Environment Law and Policy Institute (NELPI) at the University of
Tulsa College of Law, Lecturer in Law, Edo State University (Nigeria). The author wishes
to thank Professor Lakshman Guruswamy, Director of NELPI and Professors Rex Zedalis
of the University of Tulsa College of Law and John Lowe of Southern Methodist University
School of Law (Dallas) for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The
article also benefitted greatly from a Faculty Colloquy at the University of Tulsa College of
Law.
1. C. TUGENDGART & A. HAMILTON, OIL: THE BIG BUSINESS 1 (1975) in OPEC Bulletin
55 (1994). There is, however, a growing push to reduce dependence upon oil as a source of
transportation fuels for environmental reasons. But the oil industry appears generally to be
responding to the environmental concerns in different ways including the introduction of a
new fuel-the Reformulated Gasoline-which is expected to cut certain automotive emissions
by as much as 20 per cent or more. 14 Areas Exempted from the Clean Gas Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 1994, at 26.
2. M.A. Adewumi & T. Ertekin, Oil and Natural Gas Drilling and Transportation-
Environmental Problems and Control, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRO-
DUCTION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 141 (S.K. Majumdar et al., eds., 1987). See also G.
ETKERENTSE, NIGERIAN PETROLEUM LAW 62 (1985) (asserting that even in the best of oil field
practice, spillage of crude oil and the resultant pollution cannot be completely eliminated).
3. See infra notes 34-50. This is not to suggest, however, that the pollution of the other
media is not troubling. Arable farmlands have been lost to oil pollution. A Bendel State
Government publication in 1987 (now defunct) stated that about one-quarter of the availa-
ble land in the Delta area of the state had been rendered barren due to oil spillages and
leakages. See HAZARDS OF OIL EXPLORATION IN BENDEL STATE 6 (1987) (neither can the ef-
fects of gas flaring that goes on unabated in the oil producing areas in Nigeria be
underestimated).
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The problem of oil pollution in Nigeria is monumental.4 The Niger-
ian government and the oil industry are doing too little to redress the
situation.' This inaction has led to great feelings of frustration on the
part of the affected communities and has forced them to resort to mea-
sures-such as civil disobedience," protests, and riots, primarily aimed at
attracting attention to their plight and ultimately, in most cases, leading
to disruptions of oil production.7 Perhaps the most famous was the agita-
tion caused by the Ogoni tribe in Southeastern Nigeria for compensation
and environmental restoration. This disturbance continues to attract
4. Id. According to Nigeria's former Minister of Works and Housing, 2796 oil spill inci-
dents involving a total of 88.2 million gallons of crude oil were reported between 1976 and
1990. Nigeria To Tighten Pollution Control, THE OIL DAILY, Dec. 17, 1991, at 2(1). Note,
however, that the actual quantity spilled during this period might have been much more
than that stated since for much of the period, the operating companies freely chose whether
to report a spill incident or not depending particularly on their judgment of which spills
they considered significant. See Soga A. Awobajo, An Analysis of Oil Spill Incidents in
Nigeria: 1976-1980, in THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY AND THE NIGERIAN ENVIRONMENT-PROCEED-
INGS OF 1981 INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR 57 (1981) [hereinafter THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY]. The
country continues to be treated to reports of deaths, evacuation of whole villages, destruc-
tion of property and sea life, pollution of drinking water and drastic fall in the people's
standard of living all as a result of oil pollution. F.O. McOliver, Legislating Environmental
Protection: Cost-Benefit Analysis, in THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 43. In fact, recent press
reports which stated that some oil producing communities in Nigeria are threatened with
extinction due to oil pollution and poverty caused by oil exploration do not seem to be
overstatements. See, e.g., Nigeria: Oil-Producing Community Threatened, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Oct. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
5. J.N. Nwankwo & D.O. Irrechukwu, Problems of Environmental Pollution and Con-
trol in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry, in THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY AND THE NIGERIAN
ENVIRONMENT 102, 105 (1985) (stating that "since the inception of the oil industry in [Nige-
ria] ... there has been no concerted and effective effort on the part of government or the oil
companies to control the environmental effects of the petroleum industry"). But see 0.
Adewale, Federal Environmental Protection Agency Decree and the Petroleum Industry,
16 J. PRIVATE & PROPERTY L. 51, 63 (1992/93) (stating that the Department of Petroleum
Resources has done a commendable job). On the part of the industry little, voluntary action
is ever taken to redress the situation. For instance, after nearly four decades of Shell's oper-
ations in Nigeria, and probably acting under pressure from environmental groups, it only
recently saw fit to support an "independent, internationally coordinated" environmental
study of operation areas. Shell Hopes Niger Study Disproves Pollution Claims, JOURNAL OF
COMMERCE, Jan. 9, 1995, at 5B. See also Shell Admits Causing Pollution in Nigeria, An-
nounces Survey Plan, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, CURNWS File. Earlier, the Trustee Savings Bank of U.K. sold its holdings in Shell
"in protest at the company's environmental and social policies in Nigeria." 'Green' Shell
Shares Sold in Protest at Spills, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 24, 1994, at 12.
6. For instance, the Ogoni tribe in southeastern Nigeria successfully boycotted elections
held in June 1993 which were, however, later annulled by the military for wholly unrelated
reasons.
7. The Department of Petroleum Resources has stated that in 1993 alone oil companies
"lost about 30 million barrels of crude [oil]" due to clashes with communities. Nigeria: Tri-
bal Heads Press Oil Companies to Meet Local Needs, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Oct. 28, 1994,
at 11B. Recently, one of the communities (Ugborodo) in an open letter to Nigeria's military
ruler threatened to disrupt Chevron's oil field in protest against the company's failure to
pay them compensation for spills dating back to 1978. Chevron Faces Nigerian Threat Over
Spill Protests, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Oct. 25, 1994, at 5B.
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some measure of international attention.8 The reaction of the Nigerian
government has been to forcefully suppress these uprisings, resulting in
gross violations of human rights.9 Adopting a comparative approach, this
article will argue that the government of Nigeria and the oil industry can
and should address the concerns of its communities, thereby curtailing
the damaging consequences of continuing oil pollution and the losses in-
curred from disruption in production encouraged by the present
situation.
First, in Section II, this article considers the sources of oil in the dif-
ferent water bodies and its effects. While the major concern with oil pol-
lution in the United States appears to be with transportation-related ac-
tivities, in Nigeria, oil field pollution presents the greatest risk to the
health of all organisisms. The effects of oil pollution of water to humans,
marine organisms, and the ecology will be briefly discussed. Second, in
Section III, the attempts to regulate pollution in the oil industry, as it
affects water, in Nigeria will be compared with the approach employed in
the United States. The comparison is relevant despite the huge techno-
logical and economic disparities between the two nations. Since oil explo-
ration and production is a global industry, dominated largely by the same
group of transnational corporations,10 they should be expected to adopt
the same standards and technology worldwide for the uniform protection
of the planet from pollution. Oil is an international commodity which
brings the same price per barrel regardless of where it is produced. Thus,
it can be asserted that the oil producing corporations make the same
profits from their operations no matter whether the oil is produced from
Nigeria or the United States." Since these corporations have the technol-
8. Various international groups (e.g. Amnesty International, Greenpeace, International
PEN, etc.) and some British MPs are involved in the Ogoni struggle against exploitation
and the pollution of its environment by oil extraction. This struggle by the Ogoni tribe
championed by its Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) earned the organi-
zation and its leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa the 1994 Right Livelihood Award. Nigerian Rights
Activist, Self-Help Groups Win Alternative Nobel, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 12, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File. For graphic accounts of the ordeals and
struggle of the Ogoni tribe, see John Vidal, Born of Oil, Buried in Oil, THE GUARDIAN
(London), Jan. 4, 1995, at T2; Shell-Shocked: The Environmental and Social Costs of Liv-
ing with Shell in Nigeria, GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, July 1994 [hereinafter Shell-
Shocked].
9. According to Amnesty International in its report of November 10, 1994,
"[g]overnment forces are killing and raping civilians and pillaging their towns in retribution
for complaints about pollution from the country's oil industry." Nigerian Troops Hit on
Rape, Pillage, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at A21.
10. The seven major companies, widely known as the "seven sisters" were the British
Petroleum, Exxon, Mobil, Shell, Gulf, Chevron, and Texaco. But with the Chevron/Gulf
merger there are now only "six sisters." See generally A. SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS: THE
GREAT OIL COMPANIES AND THE WORLD THEY MADE (1976). The oil industry in Nigeria is
dominated by four of these multinationals, with Shell accounting for about half of Nigeria's
crude production.
11. The profit margins might even be higher in many of the developing countries be-
cause of lower taxes, cheaper labor, and overall lower costs of production.
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ogy required to minimize the adverse impact of oil exploration and pro-
duction on the environment, the same technology should be employed in
all of their operations worldwide. However, Nigeria's experience in repli-
cating operations of other countries reveals that absent a strict and viable
regulatory regime, multinational corporations use less expensive and
sloppy production methods with obvious deleterious effects solely to max-
imize profits. A recent report by Greenpeace International noted that:
While oil companies' operations in developed regions are usually ac-
companied by environmental impact assessments, social and environ-
mental policies and not to mention a great deal of effort to appease
the justified concerns of local communities these practices are not ex-
ported to lesser developed regions where little or no media attention is
paid and where accountability is unheard of."
This article argues, therefore, that disparities in standards in oil ex-
ploration and production in different countries are more a function of the
value attached to environmental care by those countries than the state of
their technological and economic development. s
Third, in Section IV, this article assesses the strengths and weak-
nesses of the Nigerian and U.S. approaches. It examines the numerous
and sometimes overlapping Nigerian and U.S. statutes, the common law,
and, to a limited extent, international law to demonstrate that the cur-
rent approach in both countries: 1) focuses largely on post-accident re-
sponse rather than prevention, 2) that prevention of pollution is a more
effective approach, and 3) that liability for oil spills is inappropriate. It
will also show why certain aspects of environmental regulation in the oil
industry are in the interest of public health and should not be subjected
to economic analysis as urged by the industry.
12. Shell-Shocked, supra note 8, at 9. With particular regard to Shell's operations in
Nigeria, the report added that the company's "operations and materials are outdated, in
poor condition and would be illegal in other parts of the world. Id. This view was clearly
corroborated by a U.S. petroleum executive who stated that "foreign companies can operate
in Nigeria in ways they cannot do just a few miles off the coast of California," Oil and
Politics Make for Dangerous Mix in Nigeria, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1994, at M2, and by a
senior official of the World Wide Fund for Nature who also stated that "people get away
with things in Nigeria that they'd be locked up for in the Gulf of Mexico." Shell: After
Years of Criticism, Company Changing Habits, GREENWIRE, Jan. 25, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File. Any wonder then why the amount of oil spilled by
Shell in Nigeria alone between 1982-1992 accounted for about 40 percent of the company's
total spills in its operations in more than 100 countries in the same period, whereas Nigeria
accounts for only 14 percent of Shell's total production. Shell-Shocked, supra note 8, at 6,
12. On the attitude of transnational corporations towards environmental care in developing
countries, see MICHAEL REDCLIFr, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: EXPLORING THE COTRADIC-
TIONS 73-78 (1987).
13. The link between development and environmental protection is conceded but may
not justify all cases of neglect. See J. MAYDA, Environmental Legislation in Developing
Countries: Some Parameters and Constraints, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 997, (1984/85) (noting some
of the constraints facing developing countries in their quest for environmental protection).
See infra, notes 324-332 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Section VI recommends that the enforcement machinery in
the Nigerian law be strengthened and that the governments of all oil pro-
ducing and consuming nations apply greater pressure on transnational oil
corporations to adopt environmentally safe technologies and procedures
in their operations worldwide. It is the joint respnsibility of all nations to
develop a sustainable policy for all parts of the world. 4
II. SOURCES OF OIL IN WATER
Oil, including its products and wastes can enter water from a variety
of sources occuring at every stage of production, transportation, refining,
and use. These sources include: 1) discharges of sludge from oil tankers,
2) disposal of oil-containing waste water from ships, 5 3) accidental rup-
ture or grounding of oil tankers, 4) dumping of waste oil, 5) natural oil
seeps,' 6 6) intentional discharge as a weapon of war,' 7 7) leaks from stor-
age facilities and pipelines, 8) well blowouts, 9) atmospheric fallout, and
10) improper discharge of wastes such as produced water, drilling muds,
cuttings and refinery effluents. According to the U.S. Council on Environ-
mental Quality," vessel-source pollution constitutes the major source of
oil pollution in and around U.S. waters. This pollution occurs mainly
through operational discharges by oil tankers and accidental spills.'"
Pipeline accidents and spills at production wells, refineries, and storage
facilities also contribute to the oil pollution problem but in less signifi-
cant proportions."'
14. See The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992),
Principles 6, 7 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
15. See ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrv, ExECUTIVE OF-
FICE OF THE PRESIDENT 50 (1989).
16. It has been estimated that somewhere between 0.2 million and 6 million metric tons
of oil are discharged annually through this natural process. R. D. Wilson, Estimates of the
Annual Input from Natural Marine Seepage, in OCEAN AFFAIRS BOARD EFFECT OF PETRO-
LEUM IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 1 (1973).
17. For instance, during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq was reported to have intentionally
released over 6 million barrels of crude oil into the Arabian Gulf as a military weapon. See
M.J.T. Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modern Warfare: Cus-
tomary Substance Over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479 (1993).
18. Rio Declaration, supra note 14.
19. Worthy of mention is the spill resulting from the grounding of the Exxon Valdez in
1989 in Prince William Sound, Alaska during which a total of about 11 million gallons of
crude oil were spilled. It has been characterized as the worst environmental disaster in
America. The renewed concern that emerged in the wake of the spill created the political
momentum that led to the passage of the Oil Pollution Act, 1990. Generally, it is estimated
that ships discharge about 1.5 million tons of oil into the sea each year. INTERNATIONAL
MARIME ORGANIZATION, MANUAL ON OIL POLLUTION 1 (1988). Most spillage comes from
from routine operations such as tank washings and operational discharges, accounting for
four or five times more pollution than spills and blowouts. See CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 741 (1993). See also J.W. KiNDT,
MARINE POLLUTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 740-41 (1986) (stating that "accidental oil spills
by tankers do not even account for 10 per cent of the totals for vessel-source pollution").
20. Rio Declaration, supra note 14. But it has been contended, with some amount of
justification, that the perception of massive tanker spills as the major source of oil pollution
1995
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In comparison, in Nigeria, oil field pollution presents the greatest
risk from the oil industry."' Nigerian waters are polluted from well blow-
outs,22 indiscriminate direct discharge of production wastes and refinery
effluents on land and water, leaks from pipelines and storage tanks, spills
during storage and loading operations at terminals,28 and discharges of
waste oil into waters from motorized boats. Communities living close to
production sites, refineries, and pipelines have had to contend with pol-
luted rivers, streams, creeks, and groundwater for a long time. 4
Groundwater is further contaminated by liquids from surface im-
poundments or spills from storage tanks, pipelines, improperly closed or
abandoned oil wells, and poorly constructed injection wells. The oil, prod-
uct, or waste infiltrates the ground and percolates downward to the water
table. Whether the contaminants reach the groundwater, in fact, is de-
pendent upon a number of factors including 1) the viscosity and permea-
bility of the soil, 2) the quantity and characteristics of the pollutant, and
3) the depth of the water table aquifers.28 Studies indicate that ground-
water contamination by hydrocarbons in Nigeria is significantly influ-
enced by a combination of these factors notably the low viscosity and
high permeability of Nigerian geological formations and shallow depth
in the U.S. is not true and could only be explained by the fact that such tanker spills grab
headlines and cause public outcry. Rather, it is claimed, the majority of the spills occur at
fixed facilities. See Report of Proceedings of the International Oil Spill Conference, in OIL
SPILL U.S. LAW REPORT (1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File. But see
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 376 (1994) (stating that all eight of the
catastrophic spills (those exceeding 1 million gallons) from 1976 have been the result of
tanker accidents, from the Argo Merchant grounding in December 1976 to the Exxon
Valdez spill in March 1989).
21. 'Equipment malfunction' has been found to account for 50 percent of all the spills
recorded in Nigeria. See Awobajo, supra note 4, at 59; C.N. Ifeadi & J.N. Nwankwo, Critical
Analysis of Oil Spill Incidents in Nigerian Petroleum Industry, in THE PETROLEUM INDUS-
TRY AND THE NIGERIAN ENVIRONMENT-PROCEEDINGS OF 1987 INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR 104,
108-09 [hereinafter THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 1987].
22. The Funiwa-5 well blowout of January 17, 1980, discharged about 17.6 million gal-
lons of crude oil into the waters. A study done after this incident found among other results
that well water in the area contained 40 times the permissible amount of petroleum, hydro-
carbon penetrated about 50 miles inland, and about 100 miles of sand beach were affected.
Palczynski, Hydrocarbon Concentration in the Gulf of Guinea After Major Oil Spills, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF AICHE SUMMER NATIONAL MEETING, quoted in Okogu, Economic Aspects of
Oil Spillages: Risk Management and Options for Coping, in PROCEEDINGS OF INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON THE NATIONAL OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR NIGERIA 60, 65 (1991).
23. On July 6, 1979, a rupture of a storage tank at the Forcados Terminal led to an
escape of some 23.9 million gallons of oil into the waters. E.C. Odogwu, Economic and So-
cial Impacts of Environmental Regulations on the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria, in THE
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 4, at 49, 50. That incident remains to date the largest
single spill in Nigeria.
24. For instance, until fairly recently there were hardly any restrictions on the dis-
charge of wastes with the result that water bodies were the direct receiving medium. See
infra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
25. Akomeno U. Oteri, A Study of the Effects of Oil Spills on Ground Water, in THE
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 4, at 89.
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aquifers.2 6 As a result of these geologic qualities, groundwater contamina-
tion by hydrocarbons is a widespread and growing environmental problem
in Nigeria.2 7 Direct spills of hydrocarbons into groundwater are particu-
larly problematic, because minor spills can pollute a large volume of
water for a considerable period of time." Such spills have turned water
wells in some communities into "gasoline wells.
29
III. EFFECTS OF OIL ON WATER
There has not always been a consensus, even among scientists, on the
exact effects of oil pollution on water. Studies of specific spills have
shown considerable disagreement on the damage and magnitude arising
from such spills, attributable to the opposing interests of those undertak-
ing the studies.2 0 Yet another source of uncertainty is the many variables
which could influence the impact of oil pollution on the receiving water. 2
These include the type and volume of oil, hydrography, climatic or sea-
sonal changes, length of contact, previous exposure of the area to oil, and
the indigenous biota. However, a review of the literature2 reveals that
26. See, e.g., Ifreadi & Awa, Groundwater Contamination by Hydrocarbons in the
Nigerian Petroleum Industry, in THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 1987, supra note 21, at 84-85.
The authors stated that Nigerian crude oils are characteristically light and, therefore, have
higher percentage of the lighter, more water-soluble components, and are less viscous than
the heavier crudes. Their downward migration is also favored by the geology which is char-
acterized by an overlying permeable layer.
27. Id. at 85 (stating that the greatest number of the contamination cases are from
buried storage tanks and delivery pipelines). In the U.S., the Conservation Foundation in its
1987 review of environmental trends had observed that existing pollution control programs
had done little to protect groundwater quality. It noted that "contamination is widespread,
threatening drinking water supplies for millions of Americans." STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
A VIEW TOWARD THE NINETIES 87-88 (Conservation Foundation ed., 1987).
28. Fodeke & Ladan, Guidelines for Environmental Quality Monitoring in Oil, Gas,
and Petrochemical Industries in Nigeria, in THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 1987, supra note 21,
at 27, 28.
29. OTERI, supra note 5. See also J.O. Osgood, Hydrocarbon Dispersion in Ground-
water: Significance and Characteristics, 12 GROUND WATER 427 (1974) (reporting the dis-
covery of oil in a newly installed well in Pennsylvania the source of which was found to be a
pipeline rupture that happened about 20 years earlier).
30. For instance, there has been considerable disagreement on the exact magnitude of
the damage done by the Exxon Valdez spill between the industry and those serving its inter-
ests on the one hand and the government, the victims and environmental groups on the
other hand. See, e.g., INT'L PETROLEUM ENCYCLOPEDIA 189 (1993); J.M. BAKER, Two YEARS
AFTER THE SPILL: ENVIRONMENTAL RECOVERY IN PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND AND THE GULF OF
ALASKA 11 (1991); Exxon Valdez Spill Damage Worse for Animals Than Previously
Thought, Government Report Says, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 2234 (1991). A commentator wrote
that the spill not only ruined fishing in Prince William Sound but also "ruined a way of
life," and accused Exxon's scientists of concealing the true consequences of the spill. R. Ott,
Exxon Oil Spill Devastated a Way of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1994, at A16.
31. E.C. Masteller, The Influence of Oil Drilling Operations and Crude Oil on the Bio-
logical Community, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION, supra note
2, at 164.
32. S.E. Manaham, Environmental Chemistry 29 (5th ed., 1991); Masteller, supra note
31 at 167; J.M. BAKER, supra note 30; R.O. ANDERSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE PETROLEUM
1995
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there is a consensus that water can be adversely affected by the presence
of petroleum, its product, or waste. In other words, it is generally agreed
that petroleum in water is harmful, even though the extent of the harm
may not be agreed upon.
The impact could be on the aquatic life, aesthetic values, recreation,
navigation, or even the health of humans. The presence of oil, or its resul-
tant tar residues in the form of pellets, balls, or globs on the beaches, is
unsightly and impairs recreational activities like swimming or water ski-
ing. These effects are important, but the concern about petroleum-caused
damage to water goes far beyond appearances and recreation. The great-
est concerns are for the health and safety of lifeforms and the long-term
ecological and environmental well-being of the planet."
A. Effect on Aquatic Life
Aquatic life can be affected in more than one way. Oil, as many other
pollutants in water, consumes dissolved oxygen during degradation, and a
shortage of oxygen could be fatal to the living organisms in water. Many
fish kills are caused not by the direct toxicity of pollutants, but by the
biodegradation of pollutants which consumes and causes a deficiency of
life sustaining oxygen." A Council on Environmental Quality report
stated:
In relation to toxicity, a significant positive correlation has been re-
ported between concentration of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons"
metabolites and mutations in marine organisms. Studies have also
shown that certain polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons induce carci-
noma formation in various marine organisms and can be acutely
toxic.8 6
Known effects to marine organisms include disruption of physiologi-
cal or behavioral activities which may reduce many species' resistance to
INDUSTRY 246 (1984); Nwankwo & Irrechukwu, supra note 5, at 102-04; J.W. KINDT, supra
note 19, at 751-52; ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS, supra note 15; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
OCEAN SCIENCES BOARD, OIL IN THE SEA-INPUTS, FATES, AND EFFECTS 383, 483, 487 (1985);
Idoniboye & Andy, Effect of Oil Pollution in Aquatic Environment, in THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY AND THE NIGERIAN ENVIRONMENT-PROCEEDINGS OF 1985 INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
311; R.S. WILLIAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR (1991); H.R.
JONES, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 3 (1973).
33. ANDERSON, supra note 32 at 246. For a general discussion on some of these injuries,
see also Thomas R. Post, Private Compensation for Injuries Sustained by the Discharge of
Oil from Vessels on the Navigable Waters of the United States: A Survey, 4 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 25, 29-31 (1972/73).
34. S.E. Manaham, supra note 32, at 29.
35. These are complex chemical compounds that are found in, among other sources,
unburned fossil fuels, such as crude oil, coal, and peat.
36. Rio Declaration, supra note 14, at 47. See also ANDERSON, supra note 32, at 246
(stating that although petroleum products are not usually very active chemically, many
products and components of crude oil are toxic and that have the potential to kill and injure
marine organisms and even human beings when ingested or inhaled).
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infection or stress and interference with reproductive capabilities. Addi-
tional effects are disturbance of the food chain, and "direct coating"
which impedes the vital processes of respiration and feeding in animals,
prevents sunlight penetration to plants, and increases temperature by ab-
sorbing solar radiation. 7 Any one, or a combination of these effects, re-
sults in massive kills of fish, fish eggs and larvae, birds, otters, crabs, and
other animals inhabiting water."8 These effects could ultimately dislocate
the social and economic life of the communities who rely on the contami-
nated waters for fishing, particularly subsistence fishing. This has been
the fate of many of the riverine oil-producing, fishing-dependent commu-
nities in Nigeria.
B. Effect on Human Health
Of greater concern is the potential for these contaminants to create a
hazard to human health. In Nigeria, the problem is exacerbated by two
factors. First, most of rural Nigeria, and even some cities, lack access to
potable water. Less than 22 percent of rural Nigeria has access to safe
water s9 and most of the oil-producing communities do not fall into this
small class. 40 As a result of the lack of water treatment facilities, the ma-
jor sources of water for drinking are rivers, streams, and groundwater.
Second, operators in the Nigerian petroleum industry have had consider-
able leeway in their manner of operations. Insufficient consideration has
been given to the environment in which oil producers operate.41 Wastes
from their operations have, in many cases, been discharged on land or
surface water, and oil leaks into fresh water bodies have not been
promptly remedied."2 More so than in developed countries, the result in
Nigeria, shows that wastes from oil fields, refineries, pipelines, and stor-
37. Id. at 50. See also KINDT, supra note 19, at 751.
38. A government report on the Exxon Valdez spill stated that by 1991 the spill had
killed half of Prince William Sound's sea otter population, 580,000 sea birds, and had
caused a 70 percent higher death rate in salmon eggs in the region. 21 Envtl. L. Rep. 2234
(1991). A 25,000 gallon oil spill from a barge in 1986 off the central California coast was
reported to have "wiped out prime sea bird habitat and killed approximately 10,000 birds."
Apex Oil to Pay $6.4 Million to Settle Federal, California Claims from 1986 Spill, 25 Envtl.
L. Rep. 1029 (1994). Fish-kill was also reported from the Funiwa-5 oil well blowout in Nige-
ria. E. Ekekwe, The Funiwa-5 Oil Well Blowout, in THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note
4, at 64, 66; NWANKWO & IRRECHUKWU, supra note 5, at 102. J.M. BAKER, supra note 30, at
13 (also reported a 90 percent mortality of fish eggs and larvae in the areas affected by the
Torrey Canyon spill off southwest England and the Argo Merchant spill off Nantucket).
39. WORLD RESOURCE INSTITUTE, THE 1994 INFORMATON PLEASE ENVIRONMENTAL ALMA-
NAc 437 (1994).
40. See Vidal, supra note 8.
41. See Nwanko & Irrechukwu, supra note 5.
42. Id., at 103. There was a report of an incident where a damaged pipeline kept oozing
crude oil into the water system for over two months without any attention from the pipeline
owner. The report added that the affected water system was the source of drinking water for
thousands of people but was more "like grease" as a result of the spillage. Nigeria: Oil
Spillage Fuels Nigerian Rivalries, INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY (LONDON), August 15, 1993, at
10.
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age tanks pose an increased risk to human health because of greater con-
tamination of drinking water by petroleum.48
The intake by humans of some of these contaminants poses grave
health hazards, since they have been proven to be toxic." Brine has been
found to be sufficiently toxic to be harmful to animals, including
humans.45 Refinery effluents are also known to contain heavy metals, in
concentrations beyond tolerable limits, which cause metabolic malfunc-
tions in humans.4" Many of the chemicals derived from crude oil, like
benzene, toluene, butylene, and others are proven carcinogenic, muta-
genic and teratogenic. 47 The high incidence of respiratory disorders, can-
cer, asthma, and birth deformity in many of Nigeria's oil-producing com-
munities has been attributed to oil pollution.4 Life expectancy in one
community is 45 years, compared to Nigeria's nationwide rate of 57
years.4" A report on the Funiwa 5 well blowout blamed the resultant oil
spill for the deaths of 180 persons in one of the affected villages two
months after the spill.50
43. Id. The Romi and Rodi rivers near the Kaduna Refinery in northern Nigeria and
the well waters in the surrounding villages are said to be heavily polluted from the petro-
leum product spillage that has occurred unabated from the refinery. See FEDERAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION IN
NIGERIA 72 (1991); FODEKE & LADAN, supra note 28, at 28 (reporting that community
boreholes in one of the villages were turned into 'gasoline wells').
44. Madu, Toxicity of Crude Oil, Impact on Food Chain and Man, in PROCEEDINGS OF
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE NATIONAL OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR NIGERIA
167, 168 (1991).
45. R.O. ANDERSON, supra note 32, at 246; Ajao et al, The Effect of Oil Formation
Water On Some Marine Organisms, in THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 4, at 80-81.
See also American Petroleum Institute, Environmental Guidance Document, Onshore Solid
Waste Management in Exploration and Production Operations § 4.1 (1989) (noting that
brine is strongly saline and that the amount of total dissolved solids in brine could be up to
150,000 parts per million; by contrast sea water ordinarily contains about 35,000 parts per
million of total dissolved solids).
46. Nwankwo & Irrechukwu, supra note 5, at 102.
47. Benzene is said to be particularly harmful because of its serious toxic effect on the
bone marrow. Benzene poisoning could lead to a variety of results including narcosis and
death. S.O. Olusi, Human Health Hazards Associated with Petroleum Related Pollution, in
THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 4, at 195, 195-96. See also Idoniboye & Andy, supra
note 32, at 311; Bloth et al, Cancer Mortality in U.S. Counties with Petroleum Industries,
198 SCIENCE 51-53 (1977) (reporting the results of a survey of cancer mortality in U.S. coun-
ties with petroleum industries which showed a correlation between high mortality rate and
existence of petroleum industries).
48. Nigeria Oil-Producing Community Threatened, supra note 4.
49. Id.
50. THE TEXACO OIL BLow-outr REPORT 120-21, 233-34 (R. Abdah ed., 1980), quoted in
J.F. Fekumo, Civil Liability for Damages Caused by Oil Pollution, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
IN NIGERIA 254, 267-68 (J.A. Omotola ed., 1990). More recently, another spillage in Nigeria
resulted in the hospitalization of about 20 villagers who "took ill after drinking water pol-
luted by the spillage." Nigerian Oil Spillage Causes Havoc, Agency Says, REUTERS WORLD
SERVICE, Nov. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
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IV. THE REGULATORY REGIMES
Both the United States and Nigeria have laws which impact the
problem of water pollution by oil. In addition, certain relevant interna-
tional rules apply to the two nations.
A. United States Oil Pollution Laws
Oil pollution legislation has a long history in the United States. Be-
ginning with the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, there are over a dozen
federal enactments in force applying, in varying degrees, to the problem
of oil pollution of water.8 1 Individual states also retain jurisdiction over
this area and have passed exercising this authority. Additionally, common
law holds oil companies liable for oil pollution under actions including
negligence, nuisance, trespass, strict liability, and negligence per se. 52 The
most popular tort liability theory asserted is nuisance because it does not
require the plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the defendant, and
also because, more than the other theories, it offers a greater chance of
recovering higher damages, including punitive damages.58
These legislative and common law rules are supplemented by a large
body of regulations enacted by the several agencies vested with jurisdic-
tion.54 The result is a complex patchwork of laws and regulations that are
time-consuming and tedious for even the most sophisticated experts to
wade through and emerge with any certainty of the law. While an exami-
nation of all the laws is beyond the scope of this paper, other scholarly
works address the interplay between international legal frameworks and
these regulatory schemes.5 5 The discussion that follows is largely re-
stricted to federal enactments and to a selected number of laws consid-
ered most significant.
51. Some of these enactments include the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Ocean Dumping
Act, Clean Water Act, Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Oil Pollution Act, Safe Drinking
Water Act, Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, Trans-Alaska Pipe-
line Authorization Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Deepwater Port Act, Ports and Water-
ways Safety Act, .etc.
52. See generally W.R. Keffer, Drilling for Damages: Common Law Relief in Oilfield
Pollution Cases, 47 S.M.U. L. REV. 523 (1994). Specifically for the strict liability rule, see
infra note 244.
53. See, e.g., Marshall v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1989).
54. At the federal level alone there are the Environmental Protection Agency, the De-
partment of Transportation (including the Coast Guard), the Army Corps of Engineers, the
Department of Interior, the Minerals Management Service, etc. The same is true of several
of the states; e.g., in Oklahoma there are the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality, Water Resources Board, and the Department of Wildlife
Conservation all exercising jurisdiction over pollution from the oil and gas industry.
55. For a detailed and masterly coverage of the subject, see MICHEAL M. GIBSON, ENVI-
RONMENTAL REGULATION OF PETROLEUM SPILLS AND WASTES (1993).
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1. The Safe Drinking Water Act"
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), passed in 1974 and amended
in 1986, is geared towards the protection of underground sources of water.
Part C protects underground waters through a regulatory program con-
trolling the subsurface injection of substances. It requires the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) to propose and promulgate "minimum
requirements" for state programs to prevent underground injection which
endangers water sources.5 7 The provisions require that state programs
must prohibit any underground injection except as authorized by permit
or by rule. The applicant for the permit has the burden of proving to the
state that the proposed underground injection will not endanger drinking
water sources. The promulgation of any rule which authorizes under-
ground injection which endangers drinking water sources is prohibited.58
However, section 300h(b)(2) provides that EPA regulations for state un-
derground injection control programs may not enact requirements which
interfere with or impede the underground injection of brine or other
fluids associated with oil and gas production either for disposal or for en-
hanced recovery, unless such requirements are essential to assure that un-
derground sources of drinking water will not be endangered by such
injection.
The EPA regulations made pursuant to the Act define five different
classifications for injection operations. 59 In this classification, Class II in-
jection wells cover the oil and gas industry injection operations. The regu-
lations for this class generally allow the injection of fluids that are
brought to the surface during oil and gas production and fluids injected
for enhanced recovery. In all cases, the law requires that underground
sources of drinking water may not be endangered by such injection.60
Amendments in 1986 to the SDWA required each state to adopt and
submit to the EPA in three years a state program to protect wellhead
areas in their jurisdiction from contaminants which may adversely affect
the health of persons.61 Also noteworthy, particularly from the point of
view of protecting public health, are the provisions of section 300(i)
granting emergency powers to the EPA. The section provides that where
the EPA determines that a contaminant is present, or is likely to enter a
public water system or an underground source of drinking water which
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f, 300j-26 (1988).
57. Id. § 300h(b)(1).
58. Id. § 300h(b)(1)(A),(B) 22.
59. 40 C.F.R. §§ 144.6, 146.5. (1995)
60. Section 300h(d)(2) provides that injection endangers drinking water sources if it
may result in the presence of any "contaminant" in underground water "which supplies or
can reasonably be expected to supply" public water systems, if the presence of such contam-
inant results in a system's not complying with any national primary drinking water regula-
tion or if it "may otherwise adversely affect the health of persons."
61. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7.
VOL. 24:1
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE U.S. AND NIGERIA
persons, the agency may take any action it deems necessary to protect the
health of such persons, including issuing orders requiring the provision of
alternative water supplies by persons who caused or contributed to the
endangerment and commencing a civil action for appropriate relief, usu-
ally an injunction.6 2
The regulation of underground storage tanks is also relevant to the
protection of underground sources of drinking water from petroleum and
other contaminants. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments's were
enacted in 1984 to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. A por-
tion of the amendments established a regulatory program for under-
ground storage tanks.6 The EPA has since promulgated regulations cov-
ering, among other things, technical standards and corrective action,
investigation, and reporting requirements for underground storage
tanks.6 5 Tanks with a capacity of 110 gallons or less are exempt from the
regulations.
2. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act66
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, referred to as the Clean
Water Act (CWA), was enacted in 1948, but significantly amended in
1972. It was passed principally to control any point source discharges into
the "waters of the United States." The Act states national goals of fisha-
ble and swimmable waters by 1983 and the elimination of pollutant dis-
charges into navigable waters by 1985.67 The basic premise of the CWA
makes the discharge of any contaminant into the waters of the United
States unlawful unless the discharge is made pursuant to a permit issued
under the Act.68 The term "waters of the United States" has been so
broadly defined by the regulations and cases that it is thought to cover all
waters that contribute or could contribute to interstate commerce includ-
ing non-navigable intermittent streams and isolated wetlands which may
seldom fill with water. 9
62. Id. at § 300i(a). Violation of or failure or refusal to comply with any such order may
attract a civil penalty of up to $5,000 for each day in which such violation or failure to
comply continues. 42 U.S.C. § 300i(b).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.
64. Id. § 6991 et seq.
65. 40 C.F.R. § 280.
66. 33 U.S.C. §8 1251-1387 (1988).
67. Id. at § 1251(a). The policy goal to eliminate all discharges into navigable waters
has been characterized as "impossible." W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER
19 (1986). The adoption of a no discharge policy by the CWA was severely criticized by the
National Water Commission, suggesting that water pollution should be defined in relative
terms depending on the uses to which the water is put at present or in the future as may be
determined by responsible public authorities. Final Report of the National Water Commis-
sion, Water Policies for the Future 69-70 (1973).
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
69. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. § 328.3; United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 106 S.CT. 455, 88 L.Ed. 2d 419 (1985); United States v. Texas Pipe Line Co., 611
F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1979); Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands,
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a. Liability for Oil Spills
Section 1321 of the CWA specifically addresses the discharge of oil
and hazardous substances into or upon the waters of the United States. It
prohibits the discharge by any person of oil or hazardous substances into
or upon the waters of the United States in such quantities as "may be
harmful," as determined by regulations made thereunder.7 0 However, cer-
tain discharges may be permitted, namely those into the contiguous zone
permitted under MARPOL 73/78,7' and those permitted in circumstances
or conditions, as regulations may stipulate.72
The EPA determined that a "harmful quantity" of oil is that which
1) violates a state water quality standard approved by the EPA under
section 1313 of the CWA, 2) "cause[s] a film or sheen upon or discolora-
tion of the surface of the water or upon adjoining shorelines, or [3])
cause[s] a sludge or emulsion to be deposited beneath the surface of the
water or upon adjoining shorelines. 78 A "sheen" is defined as "an irides-
cent appearance on the surface of the water. '74 The sheen is produced by
the refraction of light at the oil-water interface. From these definitions,
the quantity of oil spilled is inconsequential since it takes only a small
quantity of oil to create a sheen. Accordingly, liability might arise even if
no actual harm results from a discharge. This may, in fact, have been the
intention of Congress in deleting "in harmful quantities" and substituting
"quantities as may be harmful" in the 1978 amendments to the CWA.
Prior to the amendments, courts would not permit a penalty if the
defendant could prove that the discharge had not been harmful. Thus, in
United States v. Chevron Oil Company7 5 the court emphasized that by
the language of Section 311 of the CWA, Congress had not chosen to pro-
hibit all discharges of oil, but rather only discharges in "harmful quanti-
ties." However, following the amendments, the courts have held that ac-
tual harm to the environment is irrelevant when determining whether the
prohibition of discharges in Section 311 were violated. In Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Yost,7 6 the court held that the 1978 amendments authorized the
EPA to prohibit spills that "may be harmful" regardless of whether they
caused actual damage. The court stated: "In sum, the agency may both
proscribe incipient injury and measure its presence by a test that avoids
elaborated inquiry."'7 The court recognized that this approach might lead
See also 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 1 (1993).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3).
71. Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships. 17 I.L.M. 546.
72. Id.
73. 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (this is commonly known as E.P.A.'s "sheen test" for oil
discharges).
74. Id. at § 110.1.
75. 583 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1978).
76. 919 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1990).
77. Id. at 30.
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to overregulation, but it noted that "it is equally apparent that this im-
precision is a trade-off for the administrative burden of case-by-case
proceedings.""8
It is pertinent to note that not all point source discharges attract
liability under the CWA since certain discharges may be permitted.7 9 The
Act established the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) for permitting point source discharges from industrial sources,
with limitations set on the amount and characteristics of pollutants that
can be discharged under an NPDES permit. However, EPA has promul-
gated regulations forbidding the discharge of any pollutants into surface
waters from onshore oil and gas facilities.80
Whenever a vessel, offshore facility, onshore facility discharges oil or
hazardous substances, the "person in charge" of such vessel or facility is
required to report to the National Response Center as soon as he has
knowledge of the discharge.8 1 Failure to make the report as required ex-
poses the person at fault to criminal liability and punishment of up to
five years imprisonment or $500,000 fine or both."
Violation of the "no-discharge provision" or failure to comply with
the Federal Government's directives regarding cleanup operations triggers
liability for civil penalties which may be assessed administratively or de-
termined in a civil penalty action in a federal district court. The adminis-
trative penalty may be for an amount up to $25,000 per violation or
$10,000 per day for each day during which the violation continues.8 Lia-
bility for this penalty is not fault-based; instead it is a form of strict lia-
bility.8 4 In United States v. Coastal States Crude Gathering Co.,8 5 the
defendant's pipeline was installed in accordance with all applicable gov-
ernmental regulations and standard industry practice. Nevertheless, oil
leaked from it when it was struck by a vessel owned by an unknown third
party traveling well outside the navigation channel. The court upheld the
Coast Guard's imposition of a civil penalty, holding that liability for civil
penalties under Section 1321 of the CWA is absolute.8 "
It is difficult to rationalize the absence of any defenses to a civil pen-
78. Id. See also Orgulf Transport Co. v. United States, 711 F. Supp. 344, 347 (W.D. Ky.
1989).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3).
80. 40 C.F.R. § 435.32.
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5), 40 C.F.R. § 110.10. It is also provided that such report shall
not be used against the person in any criminal case arising from the discharge, except a
prosecution for perjury or for giving a false statement.
82. Id.
83. Id. at § 1321(b)(6).
84. The blameworthiness of the discharger is relevant only in the determination of the
amount of the civil penalty. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(8).
85. 643 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. den., 454 U.S. 835 (1981).
86. See also United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1978)
(upholding a civil penalty even though the facts showed that the operator was not at fault at
all).
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alty claim, but the discharger may avoid liability for cleanup costs under
certain circumstances.8 7 For instance, an owner or operator of a vessel or
facility from which a discharge occurs solely because of an act of God or
war would be liable for payment of a civil penalty, but be able to avoid
payment of removal costs. The imposition of civil penalties in circum-
stances where no fault is established on the part of the operator, as in the
above case, is as unjustified as it is unfair. The payment of compensation
to third parties for damage, if any, resulting from such spill is sufficient
liability for the discharge. The observations of Wood, Circuit Judge, in
his concurring opinion in United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.8s are
noteworthy. He stated:
I recognize ... no justification for the basic unfairness [the payment
of the penalty] involves.The company is concededly not guilty of the
slightest fault. It in no way caused the accident, except it was in busi-
ness. Just being in business of supplying critical energy or other needs
for our society scarcely justifies this type of penalty being imposed by
someone in a government agency. I fail to see how it will deter or
remedy anything. The company did not conceal the accident, but ac-
tively engaged in efforts to contain the spill .... Little good can be
accomplished in these particular circumstances by this process which
is generally considered to be contrary to the accepted principles of law
and equity.89
As noted above, the civil penalty may be assessed in federal district
courts." The penalty may be for an amount up to $25,000 per day of
violation, or an amount up to $1,000 per barrel of oil discharged. When a
discharge is found to be the result of "gross negligence or willful miscon-
duct" the penalty can be for an amount not less than $100,000, and not
more than $3,000 per barrel of oil discharged." Note, however, that this
procedure is an alternative to the assessment of an administrative pen-
alty.92 Whichever procedure is adopted, the person liable for the penalty
is the "owner, operator, or person in charge" of the vessel or facility from
which the oil is discharged. An action may also be initiated for an injunc-
tion to abate imminent and substantial threats to public health or welfare
from a vessel or facility.9
Under the CWA, the owner or operator of a facility or vessel from
which the harmful quantities of oil are discharged, either onto surface
waters or on land from where the oil is likely to reach surface water, is
87. See infra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
88. 589 F.2d 1305 (1978).
89. Id. at 1310. Bauer, Circuit Judge, also opined that the punishment of a business
that is faultless is a "self-defeating exercise of power" noting that " 'strict liability' concepts
normally refer to compensation, not punishment without fault."
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7).
91. Id. at § 1321(b)(7)(D).
92. Id. at § 1321(b)(7)(F).
93. Id. at § 1321(e).
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primarily liable to arrange for the removal of the oil.94 The federal gov-
ernment also has authority to remove or contain oil spills or threats of oil
spills. 95 Where the Federal Government acts pursuant to this authority, it
is entitled to recover the removal costs from the responsible party subject
to certain prescribed limits. 96 The monetary limits vary according to
whether the discharge is from a vessel or an onshore or offshore facility.
For onshore and offshore facilities, owners and operators are liable up to
the statutory limit of $50 million. Under regulations made pursuant to
section 1321(f)(2), the EPA has set lower limits for small onshore storage
facilities with capacity of 1,000 barrels or less.07 The limit is $200,000 for
aboveground storage facilities and $260,000 for underground storage facil-
ities. However, these regulations appear to have been superseded by later
amendments to section 1321 which limited the agency's discretion by
stipulating a minimum of $8 million in any case.98
In the case of an inland oil barge, the statutory limit is $125 per gross
ton of such barge or $125,000, whichever is greater. For any other vessel,
the amount recoverable is up to $150 per gross ton or $250,000, whichever
is greater. 99 These limits do not apply where the federal government can
show that the discharge was the result of "willful negligence or willful
misconduct" within the privity and knowledge of the owner. If a willful
violation is found, then the owner or operator is liable for the full amount
of the removal costs.10 0 It is important to note that the limits apply only
to cleanup costs sought by the federal government, they do not in any
way modify or affect the rights of the federal government, state govern-
ment, and other governmental and private parties to seek compensation
under any other law for damages to any public or private property result-
ing from the discharge or removal of oil or hazardous substances.0 '
The CWA permits certain defenses to liability. Accordingly, the
owner or operator is not liable to the government for removal costs if he
can prove that the discharge was caused solely by 1) an act of God, 2) an
act of war, 3) negligence on the part of the United States Government, or
4) an act or omission of a third party.10 2 In fact, where any of these de-
94. Id. at 1321(c).
95. Id.
96. Id. at § 1321(f).
97. 40 C.F.R. § 113.
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(q). D.E. Pierce, Regulating Surface Water Impacts Associated
with the Exploration, Development, Production, and Transportation of Oil and Gas, 1994
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., MIN. L. SER. 3-1, 3-28 to 3-29.
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (f).
100. Id.
101. Id. at § 1321(o).
102. Id. at § 1321(f). Note, however, that under subsection (g) an owner or operator of a
vessel carrying oil as cargo or an onshore or offshore facility which handles or stores oil in
bulk, from which there is a discharge, who alleges that the discharge was caused solely by
the act or omission of a third party is still liable to pay to the federal government the costs
incurred for removal and shall be entitled by subrogation to all the rights of the federal
government to recover such costs from such third party.
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fenses is available, an operator or owner who already incurred removal
costs is entitled to recover such costs from the federal government.103
b. Regulation of Produced Water
Produced water is released from containment in oil and gas bearing
formations during the course of oil and gas operations. It is also com-
monly referred to as "brine," or "salt water," or "formation water." It is
estimated that oil and gas operations in the U.S. result in the production
of about 21 billion barrels of produced water annually."0 '
Discharge of produced water in groundwater is regulated under the
SDWA, while the CWA regulates discharge into surface waters. As noted
earlier, section 1311(a) of the CWA generally prohibits the discharge of
any "pollutant" into navigable waters from a "point source" unless the
discharger obtains a permit. A point source would include a source of pro-
duced water.' 0 5 Produced water is also covered by ,the definition of the
term "pollutant". However, the definition specifically excludes water that
is either injected for disposal, or for enhanced recovery purposes when
the state where the well is located "determines that such injection or dis-
posal will not result in the degradation of ground or surface water
resources."'
1 6
Accordingly, such injections for disposal or enhanced recovery will
not require a NPDES permit. However, if the produced water is not going
to be injected, a NPDES permit is required unless an alternative disposal
technique, permitted under state law,10 7 is used which will not result in a
discharge into waters of the United States. In order to qualify for a per-
mit, the discharge must comply with effluent limitations designed to meet
state water quality standards and minimum technological requirements
imposed by the Act.'
The EPA has promulgated minimum standards for discharge of pro-
duced water and the regulations divide oil and gas operations into five
categories. 10' These categories are: 1) offshore, 2) onshore, 3) coastal, 4)
agricultural and wildlife water use, and 5) stripper. The regulations pro-
vide that NPDES permits may allow some discharges into waters in the
coastal and offshore categories, subject to limits on oil and grease con-
103. Id. at § 1321(i).
104. S. Lansdown, The Problem of Produced Water - Obtaining the Right to Dispose
of It and Avoiding Liability for Such Disposal, 44 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 3-1, 3-4
(1993). See also J.C. Harrison, An Overview of Environmental Laws and Regulations Im-
pacting Onshore E & P Operations, 42 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 9-1, 9-4 (1991)
(stating that produced water accounts for over 98 percent of all exploration and production
waste volume).
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
106. Id. at § 1362(6).
107. Such alternative disposal techniques could include road spreading, evaporation
pits, percolation pits, agricultural use, etc.
108. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
109. 40 C.F.R. Pt. 435.
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tent." For the onshore category, the regulations prohibit the discharge of
produced water and other wastes into navigable waters."' The regula-
tions, however, allow some discharges for stripper wells, defined as on-
shore wells that produce 10 barrels per well per day or less, " 2 and agricul-
tural and wildlife water use category subject to certain limitations.11 8
Violations of the prohibition or limitations attract both civil and
criminal penalties. The penalties range between 1) $2,500 and $25,000 per
day of violation, 2) $5,000 to $50,000 per day of violation for "knowing
violations," or 3) imprisonment for up to three years.1 1 4
c. Spill Prevention and Response Plans Under the CWA
As part of the government's national response system, the CWA re-
quires the EPA to promulgate regulations to prevent discharges of oil and
hazardous substances from vessels and from onshore and offshore facili-
ties.116 Pursuant to this mandate, the EPA promulgated the Oil Pollution
Prevention Regulations in 1973. " 6 The regulations require operators to
prepare written Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure (SPCC)
plans for offshore facilities and for onshore areas where spills can poten-
tially enter the waters of the United States. The SPCC plan must be re-
viewed and certified by a registered professional engineer that the plan
has been prepared in accordance with good engineering principles. 1 7
In addition to the SPCC plans, all tank vessels, all offshore facilities,
and onshore facilities, which by reason of their locations could reasonably
be expected to cause substantial harm to the environment by discharging
into the waters of the United States, are required to have individual re-
110. Id. at §§ 435.12, 425.42. The limit on daily oil and grease content for the coastal
category is 72 mg/l and a monthly average of 48 mg/l. The same limits apply to the offshore
category but under the Best Available Technology Economically Achievable (BAT) and the
New Source Performance Standard (NSPS) effluent limitations promulgated by EPA in
1993, the oil and grease discharge standards for produced water are 42 mg/l daily maximum
and a 29 mg/l average monthly maximum. Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source Category,
Offshore Sub-category; Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Stan-
dards, 58 FED. REG. 12,454. However, under guidelines recently proposed by the EPA, dis-
charge of produced water into US waters from coastal areas would be prohibited altogether
except in Cook Inlet, Alaska where the BAT limitations for oil and grease content of 42 mg/l
dally maximum and 29 mg/l average monthly maximum would still apply. See Effluent Lim-
itations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Oil
and Gas Extraction Point Source Category, Coastal Subcategory, 60 FED. REG. 9,428.
111. 40 C.F.R. § 435.32(a).
112. Id. at § 435.60.
113. Id. at §§ 435.30, 435.51-435.52. The effluent limitations established for the agricul-
tural and wildlife water use category limit oil and grease in produced water discharges to a
daily maximum of 35 mg/l. The permit for stripper wells would normally require a specified
treatment, but absent such specific requirement, discharges must comply with state water
quality standards.
114. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c), 1319(d), 1319(g).
115. Id. at § 1321(j)(1).
116. 40 C.F.R. Pt. 112.
117. Id. at § 112.3(d).
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sponse plans to address the removal of a "worst case discharge" or a
"substantial threat of such a discharge" of oil or hazardous substances.11
These individual prevention and response plans are, of course, in addition
to the National Contingency Plan and the National Response System
provided for under the CWA. " s
3. The Oil Pollution Act
The Oil Pollution Act"20 (OPA), enacted on August 18, 1990, was a
direct response to the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill. The Act establishes a
comprehensive scheme for the prevention, removal, liability, compensa-
tion, and imposition of penalties for oil pollution. However, the pre-ex-
isting statutory regime remains in effect except for the finding of liability
which is governed by the OPA. The OPA significantly raises the levels of
liability, strengthens the federal government's authority to act in case of a
spill, tightens tank equipment standards, raises the size of the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund, and requires evidence of financial responsibility for
vessels and other facilities, among other objectives.
The Act provides that in the case of a discharge of oil or a substan-
tial threat of a discharge of oil into or upon the navigable waters or ad-
joining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone from a vessel or other
facility, the "responsible party" ' shall be liable for the removal costs
and damages that result from such incident.12 2 Basically, claims against
the responsible party fall into two categories: removal costs and damages.
The first category covers costs incurred by the United States, a state, or
an Indian tribe, as well as any other person whose acts are consistent with
the National Contingency Plan for the removal of oil. 22 The damage
claims cover 1) damage to natural resources (including the reasonable
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5). The EPA on July 1, 1994 issued final revisions to the Na-
tional Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan requiring that onshore
facilities not related to transportation must prepare plans to respond to discharges of oil. 59
FED. REG. 34,070 (1994).
119. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(d), 1321(j).
120. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761. For incisive appraisals of the OPA, see generally Wagner,
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: An Analysis, 21 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 569 (1990); Antonio J.
Rodriguez & Paul A.C. Jaffe, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1 (1990);
RODGERS, supra note 20, at 375-92; Randle, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Its Provisions,
Intent, and Effects, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,119 (1991).
121. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32) for a definition of the term "responsible party" which for
most part refers to the owner or operator, but could also include a third party.
122. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). See U.S. v. South Pacific Transportation Co., (D.C. Or.
1995)(for a definition of the scope of the OPA). The U.S. sought to recover response costs
under the OPA from the defendant corporation for a spill of about 6,000 gallons of diesel
fuel from the defendant's train's fuel tanks into the Yoncalla Creek in January 1993. The
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon ruled that the derailed train was not a "facil-
ity" under the OPA. More generally, the court stated that because the OPA was intended to
regulate only oil spills occurring during commercial production and transportation, it does
not extend to oil spills occurring during its use by consumers.
123. Id. at § 2702(b)(1).
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cost for assessing the damage), 2) damage to real or personal property, 3)
loss of subsistence use of natural resources, 4) loss of revenues to govern-
ment, 5) loss of profit or impairment of earning capacity, and 6) damages
for net costs of providing increased or additional public services during or
after removal activities.124
"Natural resources" are defined to include "land, fish, wildlife, biota,
air, water, ground water, [and] drinking water supplies.2 5 In order to
make a claim for damages for loss of subsistence use of natural resources,
the ownership or management of such resources is irrelevant."' All that is
required by a claimant is proof of reliance on the natural resources for
subsistence and a causative link between the discharge and the damage to
the natural resources. Natural resource damage claims could be substan-
tial."'7 The measure of natural resource damages is "(a) the cost of restor-
ing, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged
natural resources; (b) the diminution in value of those natural resources
pending restoration; and (c) the reasonable cost of assessing those
damages."128
The OPA specifically excludes certain discharges from its scope of
authority. These are any discharges that are permitted by a permit issued
under federal, state, or local law; originate from a "public vessel; 1 2 9 or
originate from an onshore facility which is subject to the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act.130
a. Defenses
The OPA recognizes the traditional defenses in environmental law,
including acts of God, acts of war, and acts or omission of a third party, if
the responsible party establishes that he exercised due care with respect
to the oil concerned and that he "took precautions against foreseeable
acts or omissions of any such third party and the foreseeable conse-
quences of those acts or omissions."' 81 Accordingly, once a responsible
124. Id. at § 2702(b)(2).
125. Id. at § 2701(20).
126. Id. at § 2702(b)(2)(C).
127. See Schenke, Liability for Damages Arising from an Oil Spill, 4 J. NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T. L. 14 (1990).
128. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d).
129. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(29) for its definition.
130. Id. at § 2702(c).
131. Id. at § 2703(a). Notice that the sub-section does not specifically list "negligence
on the part of the United States government" as one of the defenses. However, it might be
argued that negligence on the part of the U.S. government could be regarded as an act or
omission of a third party which is recognized as a defense to liability under the Act. Further,
§ 2703(b) exculpates a responsible party of liability to a claimant "to the extent that the
incident is caused by the gross negligence or willful misconduct of the claimant." All claim-
ants under § 2702 including the U.S. government are affected by this limited defense. But
see Michael J. Uda, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Is there a Bright Future Beyond
Valdez?, 10 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 403, 422 note 138 (1991) (stating that negligence on the U.S.
government has ceased to be a defense under the OPA).
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party establishes that a discharge was caused solely by any one, or a com-
bination, of these defenses, then it is not liable for payment of damages
and removal costs. However, these defenses do not apply where the re-
sponsible party fails or refuses 1) to report the incident as required by
law, 2) to provide all reasonable cooperation and assistance sought by a
responsible official in connection with removal activities, or 3) without
sufficient cause, to comply with an order concerned with removal
activities. 
2
b. Limits on Liability
Section 2704(a) of the OPA establishes higher liability limits for dif-
ferent types of vessels and facilities. The limits are as follows:188 1) tank
vessels greater than 3,000 gross tons, $1,200 per gross ton or $10 million,
whichever is greater; 2) tank vessels of 3,000 gross tons or less, $1,200 per
gross ton or $2 million, whichever is greater; 3) non-tank vessels, $600 per
gross ton or $500,000, whichever is greater; 4) onshore facilities, $350 mil-
lion, however, through rule-making, this limit may be reduced to as low as
$8 million;18 ' and offshore facilities, the total of all removal costs plus $75
million. There are two major exceptions, namely 1) if the facility is a
deepwater port, the limit is $350 million which may, however, by
rulemaking be reduced to $50 million, 88 and 2) if the discharge or sub-
stantial threat of a discharge of oil is from any Outer Continental Shelf
facility or a vessel carrying oil as cargo from such a facility, then the
owner or operator of such facility or vessel is liable for all removal costs
incurred by federal, state, or local government or agency. 8 6
These limits do not apply 1) if the spill was caused by the gross neg-
ligence or willful misconduct of the responsible party or any person an-
swerable to him; 2) if the responsible party violates an applicable Federal
safety, construction, or operating regulation; 3) if the responsible party
fails or refuses either to report the incident as required by law when he
knows or has reason to know of the incident; 4) fails to provide all reason-
able cooperation and assistance requested by a responsible official in con-
nection with removal activities; or 5) fails without sufficient cause, to
comply with an order pertaining to removal activities.'
The OPA liability and limits just discussed are exclusively federal.
132. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
133. Id. at § 2704(a).
134. Id. at § 2704(d)(1). Such regulations are to take into account "size, storage capac-
ity, oil throughput, proximity to sensitive areas, type of oil handled, history of discharges
and other factors relevant to risks posed by the class or category of facility." Id.
135. Id. at §§ 2704(a)(4), 2704(d)(2)(C).
136. Id. at § 2704(c)(3).
137. Id. at § 2704(c)(1),(2). Some commentators have criticized these exceptions as be-
ing too broad, noting that in essence the OPA regime is one of unlimited liability. Cooney,
for instance, observed that a major oil spill is unlikely to occur "without a violation of a
federal regulation." M.K. Cooney, Comment, The Stormy Seas of Oil Pollution Liability:
Will Protection and Indemnity Clubs Survive?, 16 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 343, 369 (1993).
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There could be additional liability under state laws since state liability
laws are not preempted by the OPA. The OPA permits states to impose
additional liability or requirements with respect to oil pollution.1 s8 In
fact, most Coastal and Great Lake states have passed oil spill legislation,
the vast majority of which provide for strict unlimited liability for re-
moval costs.1"9
c. Evidence of Financial Responsibility
The law requires that there exist a responsible party for any vessel in
excess of 300 gross tons that operates in any place subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States and that offshore facilities must establish and
maintain evidence of financial responsibility sufficient to meet the maxi-
mum amount of liability for which the responsible party could be liable
under the law. 40 The sanctions for violating these requirements can be
severe. They include 1) revocation of clearance required for the vessel to
operate in U.S. waters, 2) denial of entry to U.S. waters, 3) detention of
vessel, 4) seizure and forfeiture of vessel to the U.S., 5) administrative
penalty of up to $25,000 per day of violation, or 6) a judicial order termi-
nating operations. " "
The law gives additional assurance to claimants. A claim may be as-
serted directly against the guarantor providing evidence of financial re-
sponsibility for a responsible party." In such a claim, the guarantor can-
not invoke the defenses which would otherwise be available to it under
the policy. However, the guarantor's liability is limited to the amount of
financial responsibility it has provided to the responsible party." 8 It has
been asserted that this possibility of a direct claim against the guarantor
coupled with the potential for unlimited liability under both federal and
state laws will make it extremely difficult for vessels operating in U.S.
waters to obtain insurance coverage. "4 One consequence might be a seri-
ous disruption of U.S. imported oil supply leading in turn to scarcity and
price rise.4 5
138. 33 U.S.C. § 2718.
139. GIBSON, supra note 55, at 75, 127; Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 120, at 10-11.
140. 33 U.S.C. § 2716.
141. Id. at §§ 2716(b), 2716a.
142. Id. at § 2716(f).
143. Id. at § 2716(g).
144. Cooney, supra note 137, at 360 (asserting that as the law is, "no one will be capa-
ble of obtaining a certificate of financial responsibility"). At a hearing by the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation on the in-
terim rules on financial responsibility, the Subcommittee Chairman, Representative W.J.
Tauzin, expressed concern that many vessel owners would be unable to fulfill the require-
ments to secure the certificates of financial responsibility, and advised the Coast Guard "to
proceed cautiously." He feared that up to 50 percent of U.S. oil supply could be in jeopardy
if shippers fail to qualify for the certificates. Shipping Representatives Tell Concerns on
Financial Responsibility Interim Rule, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 584 (1994). The requirements for
certificates of financial responsibility became enforceable on Dec. 28, 1994.
145. The concern about the possible disruption of imported oil supply prompted sev-
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d. Other Provisions
Another source of worry for the shipping industry has been OPA's
requirement of double hulls for vessels operating in U.S. waters or its
exclusive economic zone. It requires that all new vessels constructed for
the carriage of oil shall be equipped with double hulls when operating in
U.S. waters or the exclusive economic zone.146 With regard to existing ves-
sels, the double hull requirement is phased in over a period of years,
starting this year, depending upon the age and size of the tank vessel. " 7
By 2010 all vessels over 5,000 gross tons must have double hulls, except
that those which currently have double bottoms or double sides may con-
tinue operating in U.S. waters until 2015."'s These provisions have been
criticized for imposing a great financial burden on the shipping industry
and the unavoidable increase on the cost of transporting oil to the U.S.' 49
Questions have even been raised about the safety of double hulls.150
The OPA also has wide ranging provisions on the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund.' 5' Principally financed by a five cent per barrel tax on im-
ported and domestic oil, 52 it is designed to cover removal costs and dam-
age claims of the federal government, state governments, and uncompen-
sated private claimants.
eral House members to write to President Bill Clinton urging him to delay implementation
of the financial responsibility rule. 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 1346 (1994). See also Shift in Insur-
ance to Cover Oil Ships May Disrupt Flow, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1994, at Al, C4; John M.
Mitchell, Comment, The United States Coast Guard's Proposed Regulation of Certificates
of Financial Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Fostering a Continuing
Market of Insurance for Shipowners?, 7 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 121, 148-49 (1993) (predicting
that the Coast Guard's "inflexible approach" will jeopardize waterborne transportation of oil
to the U.S.).
146. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a). Other preventive measures enacted by the OPA include the
additional requirements for the issuance and review of licenses, certificates of registry and
merchant mariner's documents, and for vessel manning. 46 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7106, 7107, 7109,
7302, 7701-7703.
147. Id. at § 3703a(c)(3).
148. Id.
149. See Paul S. Edelman, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 204 N.Y.L.J. 3, 23 (1990)
(stating that the average cost to retrofit a tanker with a double hull is estimated to be $30
million). The Coast Guard also estimates that the double hull requirements will increase the
average annual cost of transporting oil in U.S. waters by approximately $350 million, or
about $.16 per barrel of oil transported. It noted, however, that the cost per barrel of oil
prevented from being spilled is estimated at $24,000. 57 FED. REG. 1855 (1992).
150. Edelman, supra note 149. See also T.A. Alcock, "Ecology Tankers" and the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990: A History of Efforts to Require Double Hulls on Oil Tankers, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 97, 107-115 (1992) (detailing the arguments for and against double hulls on oil
tankers); A.A. Ayorinde, Inconsistencies Between OPA 1990 and MARPOL 73/78: What is
the Effect on Legal Rights and Obligations of the United States and Other Parties to
MARPOL 73/78, 23 J. MAR. L. & COM. 55, 89, 93-94 (1994) (suggesting that mid-deck design
and double hull offer equivalent protection and that OPA's insistence on only double hulls
amounts to a violation of U.S. international obligations assumed under MARPOL 73/78).
151. 33 U.S.C. § 2712. The Fund was first established in 1986. 26 U.S.C. § 9509.
152. 26 U.S.C. § 4611(c)(2)(B).
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The administration of the OPA is shared mainly among three agen-
cies: 1) the EPA, concerning non-transportation related onshore facilities
that could, because of their locations, cause substantial harm to the navi-
gable waters; 2) the Department of Transportation, including the Coast
Guard, concerning transportation-related onshore facilities, deepwater
ports, and vessels; and 3) to the Department of Interior concerning the
offshore facilities and associated pipelines."'
B. Nigerian Oil Pollution Laws
Anti-pollution laws in Nigeria are scattered throughout several au-
thoritative sources. They usually appear only as incidental provisions in
the statutes and regulations. Each is identified and discussed below.
1. The Petroleum Act of 1969 15
The Petroleum Act deals mainly with business regulation of the pe-
troleum industry and contains only little on pollution prevention. Never-
theless, Section 9 empowers the Minister of Petroleum Resources (Minis-
ter) to make regulations on a wide range of issues including "the
prevention of pollution of water courses and the atmosphere."''" The Act
also provides that the Minister may revoke an oil mining license or lease
if, in his opinion, the licensee or lessee "is not conducting operations con-
tinuously and in a vigorous and businesslike manner and in accordance
with good oilfield practice."'5 The law does not provide a definition of
the term "good oilfield practice," which has been interpreted in various
ways depending on the standpoint of the interpreter. For instance, to oil
producing companies, "good oilfield practice" might mean minimizing ec-
onomic cost of production without regard to safety or environmental care.
However, there is a comparable concept under the Mineral Oils (Safety)
Regulations,1 57 and it is suggested that the term should incorporate an
obligation to ensure minimal environmental harm.
Breach of the good oilfield practice requirement alone may not war-
rant a revocation of a license or lease under the Act; the other require-
ments for continuous operations conducted in a vigorous and businesslike
manner must also be satisfied. Despite the few safeguards, the use of
poorly defined terms permits maximization of production rather than
protection of the environment.
a. The Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations' "
Pursuant to the authority conferred on the Minister to make regula-
153. Executive Order 12777, 56 FED. REG. 54, 757 (1991).
154. Cap. 350 Laws of the Federation, 1990.
155. Id. at § 9(1)(a)(iii).
156. Id. at Schedule 1, 24(1)(a)(emphasis added).
157. See infra note 162.
158. Enacted in Legal Notice 69 of 1969.
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tions, several sets of regulations have been enacted, some of which con-
tain provisions on oil pollution. Perhaps the most significant provision in
The Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations (Regulations) are
contained in Regulation 25. It provides as follows:
The licensee or lessee shall adopt all practicable precautions includ-
ing the provision of up-to-date equipment approved by the Director
of Petroleum Resources, to prevent the pollution of inland waters, riv-
ers, water courses, the territorial waters of Nigeria or the high seas by
oil, mud or other fluids or substances which might contaminate the
water, banks or shore line or which might cause harm or destruction
to fresh water or marine life, and where any such pollution occurs or
has occurred, shall take prompt steps to control and, if possible, end
it.159
The Regulations further require the operator to 1) maintain all appa-
ratus, appliances, boreholes, and wells capable of producing petroleum in
good repair and condition, 2) carry out all its operations in a proper and
workmanlike manner accepted by the Director of Petroleum Resources160
as amounting to good oilfield practice, and, in particular, 3) take "all
steps practicable" to "control the flow and to prevent the escape or avoid-
able waste of petroleum" and "prevent the escape of petroleum into any
water, well, spring, stream, river, lake, reservoir, estuary or harbour." '
Regulation 40 requires the operator to drain all waste oil, brine, and
sludge or refuse into proper receptacles and dispose of them in a manner
approved by the Director.
Finally, the Regulations obligate an operator to pay "adequate com-
pensation" to any person whose fishing rights are interfered with by the
unreasonable exercise of the operator's rights.1 6 2 This is the only provi-
sion in the Regulations that seems to aid the victim of oil pollution, but it
has weaknesses and has been criticized. First, it does not clearly give a
right of action to the victim. Second, the concept of "adequate compensa-
tion" is rather vague and unsatisfactory. Third, and perhaps the most
serious objection, is the fact that the victim is not entitled to any com-
pensation unless it is established that the operator exercised its rights
"unreasonably." This, no doubt, is a difficult, if not impossible, task espe-
cially for the illiterate and poor fishermen who are more likely to be the
beneficiaries of this particular regulation. Fourth, the scope of the Regu-
lations is too restrictive. It does not cater to interests, other than fishing
rights, that might also be harmed as a result of the unreasonable exercise
of the operator's rights.
The entire body of Regulations could also be criticized for its failure
to clearly assign responsibility for cleanup in the event of an oil discharge
159. Id. at reg. 25 (emphasis added).
160. Hereinafter referred to as the Director.
161. Id. at Reg. 23.
162. Id. at Reg. 25.
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into water. The operator is merely required to "control and, if possible,
end [the pollution]." '16 8 This cannot be justifiably interpreted to require
responsibility for cleanup and restoration of the polluted environment."'
Another obvious shortcoming in the Regulations is the absence of any
specific sanction for violation of any of the obligations imposed upon the
operator apart from the general power of the Minister to revoke the oper-
ator's license or lease for failure to comply with the enabling Act or any
regulations issued thereunder. 65 The sanction of revocation of a lease or
license for every case of non-compliance with the Act or regulations is
unrealistic and not feasible. Despite several obvious cases of non-compli-
ance, not a single case in the quarter century that the Regulations have
existed has succeeded when invocation of the Minister's power for breach
of the anti-pollution provisions was requested.
The Regulations have also been severely criticized for being too gen-
eral to create any legal obligation. Such terms as "proper and workman-
like manner," "good oilfield practice," "all practicable precautions," and
"adequate compensation" are cited as being too vague and meaningless to
be enforceable. 66 Additionally, the Regulations fail to provide any defini-
tions of these terms. While this is a valid objection, but it might be ar-
gued that those terms do, in fact, set very high standards for the opera-
tors. For instance, the requirement of "all practicable precautions" or the
provision of "up-to-date equipment" can only be reasonably judged by
global standards, particularly considering the transnational status of most
of the operators. 67 That argument, however, does not detract from the
need for greater precision in the promulgation of standards in Nigeria.
b. Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations 6 8
Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations were made under the Mineral Oils
Act, which was repealed by the Petroleum Act. Even though the Act was
repealed, its regulations were saved and deemed reconfirmed under Sec-
tion 9 of the Petroleum Act. 69 They deal generally with safety concerns
in the oilfield. The sections dealing specifically with oil pollution of water
are regulations 7 and 16. Regulation 7 provides that in the absence of any
163. 0. Akanle, Pollution Control Regulation in the Nigerian Oil Industry, Nigerian
Inst. of Advanced Legal Studies Occasional Paper 16 (1991).
164. Petroleum Act, Schedule 1 11 24(1)(b).
165. See, e.g., Akanle, supra note 163, at 13; 0. Adewale, Rylands v. Fletcher and the
Nigerian Petroleum Industry, 8/9 J. PRIVATE & PROPERTY L. 37, 48 (1987/88); Y. Omorogbe,
Regulation of Oil Industry Pollution in Nigeria, in NEW FRONTIERS IN LAW 147, 152-53
(Epiphany Azinge ed., 1991).
166. Cf. Regulation 7 of the Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations (Legal Notice 45 of 1963)
which defines "good oilfield practice" for the purpose of the regulations as the "Current
Institute of Petroleum Safety Codes, the American Petroleum Institute Codes or the Ameri-
can Society of Mechanical Engineers Codes." Id.
167. Legal Notice 45, 1963.
168. Cap. 350, Schedule 4, 4.
169. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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specific provision, all drilling, production and other operations necessary
for the production and subsequent handling of crude oil and natural gas
shall conform with "good oilfield practice." In a marked departure from
the trend of the other enactments, the regulation provides a definition of
"good oilfield practice."1 " The regulations also require bulk storage tanks
to have provisions made for containing any leakage to prevent oil contam-
inating the water when located above water. 171 The sanction for violation
of these provisions is a one hundred naira17 1 fine or six months imprison-
ment or both.1 7 1
c. Petroleum Refining Regulations 17 4
In language similar to that of the Petroleum (Drilling and Produc-
tion) Regulations, the Petroleum Refining Regulations require a refining
company to adopt "all practicable precautions," including the provision
of up-to-date equipment as may be specified by the Director to prevent
pollution of the environment by petroleum or petroleum products, and
where such pollution occurs, to take prompt steps to control, and if possi-
ble, end it.'7 5 It specifically requires that drainage and disposal of refinery
effluent and drainage water shall conform to "good refining practices,"
subject to approval by the Director.77 The Petroleum Refining Regula-
tions also make provision as to the physical quality of storage tanks in
order to contain leakage from tanks1 77 and for reporting of "unpro-
grammed" spillages of crude oil, products, or chemicals inside the
refinery. 7 1
In sum, Regulation 7 states that, absent any specific provision, the
construction, operation, and m ilntenance of a refinery shall conform to
"international standards" subject to the approval of Director. 7 9
2. Oil in Navigable W ters Act, 196880
The Oil in Navigable/aters Act of 1968 (Act) has remained the only
legislation entirely devoted to oil pollution of water. However, its scope is
170. Reg. 16(2)(C).
171. Id.
172. At the official exchange rate, one U.S. dollar exchanges for twenty two naira, but
in the autonomous foreign exchange market a dollar fetches over seventy naira.
173. Reg. 27. Note that it is the "manager" of the operator who is liable for breaches of
the regulations.
174. Legal Notice 45, 1974.
175. Id. at reg. 43(3).
176. Reg. 43(1); Reg. 27 also requires that residues, sludges, rusts, and similar matter
from tanks which may have contained leaded petroleum products shall be disposed of ac-
cording to "good refining practices" and only to such places as have been approved by the
Director.
177. Reg. 24.
178. Reg. 38.
179. Reg. 45.
180. Cap. 337 Laws of the Federation (1990).
VOL. 24:1
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE U.S. AND NIGERIA
severely restricted, and its usefulness is suspect. It was enacted not so
much out of the Nigerian government's concern for environmental well-
being, but to quell the government's desire to comply with its interna-
tional obligation under the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution of the Sea by Oil to protect navigable waters from oil
pollution. 181
It is an offense for a Nigerian ship to discharge oil into a part of the
sea designated as "prohibited sea area," 16 2 attracting a fine for the owner
or master of the ship not exceeding 2,000 naira on summary trial. 81 Pro-
hibited sea areas are listed in a Schedule contained in the Act and essen-
tially cover all sea areas within 50 miles from land and outside the terri-
torial waters of Nigeria and all the seven seas. 84 Section 3 also makes it
an offense to discharge oil from any vessel from any place on land, or
from any apparatus used for transferring oil from or to a vessel into the
"whole of the sea within the seaward limits of the territorial waters of
Nigeria" and all other waters within those limits including inland waters
which are "navigable by sea-going ships."'185 This provision would appear
to cover all types of onshore and offshore facilities, but its usefulness is
diminished by the restrictions on the places where it applies. The require-
ment that the waters must be navigable by sea-going ships clearly sug-
gests that the legislative policy of the enactment was to protect naviga-
tion only. 180
Another factor that seriously puts the efficacy of the Act into ques-
tion is the myriad of very liberal defenses it allows. For example, it is a
complete defense to establish that the discharge from a vessel occurred 1)
for the purpose of securing the safety of any vessel, 2) for the purpose of
preventing damage to any vessel or cargo, 3) for the purpose of saving
life, 87 4) as a consequence of damage to the vessel, or 5) by reason of
leakage if the leakage was not due to any want of reasonable care. 88
Other defenses include 1) sabotage, 8 2) absence of negligence,"' and 3)
showing that the oil was contained in an effluent produced from a
refinery. 9'
181. The Convention was subsequently amended in 1962, 1969 and 1971. The Preamble
to the Act clearly confirms the motive. See Akanle, supra note 163, at 4.
182. Cap. 337, Sec. 1.
183. Id. at § 6.
184. 1 and 2 of the Schedule to the Act.
185. §§ 3(1), 3(2). A violation attracts a fine not exceeding 2,000 naira (Sec 6).
186. Other provisions of the Act (e.g., §§ 8 and 9) which seek to protect only the waters
of the harbor from oil additionally confirm the general intendment of the legislation.
187. § 4(1). A commentator rightly characterized this defense as "alarming." A.
IBIDAPO-OBE, CRIMINAL LIABLrrY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY OIL POLLUTION (1988). Article IV
of the Convention in almost identical language makes provision for the same defenses.
188. § 4(2).
189. § 4(4).
190. § 4(3).
191. § 4(5).
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3. Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act, 1988192
The Nigerian Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act (FEPA)
remains to date the most comprehensive environmental legislation passed
in the country's history. The dumping by an Italian firm of toxic waste in
Nigeria in 1988 was the catalyst the government needed to enact the leg-
islation after more than ten years of procrastination. 1" It establishes
FEPA as the implementing authority with responsibility, among others,
to establish environmental criteria, guidelines, and standards for the pro-
tection of the "nation's air and interstate waters as may be necessary to
protect the health and welfare of the population from environmental
degradation." 1 "
Section 20 prohibits the "discharge in such harmful quantities of any
hazardous substance into the air or upon the land and the waters of Nige-
ria" or adjoining shorelines except as permitted or authorized by any law
in force in Nigeria. A violation of this prohibition secures a penalty of
100,000 naira fine, ten years imprisonment, or both; where the offense is
committed by a corporate body, the penalty is 500,000 naira and an addi-
tional fine of 1,000 naira for every day the offense subsists.195 In addition
to criminal penalties, the owner or operator of the vessel or facility from
which the discharge occurred is also liable for the costs of removal, resto-
ration or replacement of natural resources destroyed as a result of the
discharge, and "costs of third parties in the form of reparation, restora-
tion, restitution, or compensation as may be determined by FEPA from
time to time." 19 The owner or operator is, however, free from this addi-
tional liability if he or she can prove that the discharge was caused solely
by a natural disaster, by an act of war, or by sabotage. 197 The discharger
is also required to give immediate notice of the discharge to FEPA, begin
"immediate cleanup operations," and promptly comply with other direc-
tions as FEPA may prescribe.1 9
192. Cap. 131 Laws of the Federation, 1990. See generally Adewale, supra note 5.
193. The dumping incident also led to the promulgation of the Harmful Waste (Special
Criminal Provisions, etc.) Act, Cap. 165 Laws of the Federation, (1990) (providing stern
penalties for dumping of "harmful waste" in Nigeria).
194. § 5(g). FEPA is also mandated to make recommendations to the minister with
responsibility for the environment (currently the Minister of Works & Housing) for the pur-
pose of establishing water quality standards for the inter-state waters to protect the public
health or welfare and enhance the quality of water, taking into consideration -the use and
value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, agri-
cultural, industrial and other legitimate uses. § 15.
195. §§ 20(1), 20(2), 20(3). Note that under § 20(4), where the offense is committed by a
corporate body, the official in charge of the corporation at the time the offense was commit-
ted is also liable to be proceeded against and punished unless he can establish that the
offense was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to pre-
vent the discharge.
196. § 21(1).
197. Id.
198. § 21(2).
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The Act does not provide a definition of "hazardous substance" but
mandates FEPA to determine what it amounts to for purposes of Section
20.' FEPA has determined that "hazardous substance" means:
1. Any material that poses a threat to human health and/or the envi-
ronment. Typical hazardous substances are toxic, corrosive, ignitable, ex-
plosive, or chemically reactive, or
2. Any substance designated by FEPA to be reported if a designated
quantity of the substance is spilled in the waters of Nigeria or if other-
wise emitted to the environment.00
Though oil has not been listed as a hazardous substance, it is submit-
ted that in view of the threat oil poses to human health and environ-
ment,20' it qualifies as a hazardous substance under the first prong of the
definition. The definition is encompassing enough to also include produc-
tion wastes and oil products. 02
FEPA has severe limitations concerning the control of oil that reduce
the Act's efficacy in preventing oil pollution of water. First, Section 20
does not absolutely prohibit the discharge of hazardous substance upon
the nation's waters. What is prohibited is the discharge of such substance
in "harmful quantities." Consequently, the mere discharge of oil upon the
waters, does not, by itself, attach liability under the Act. It must be
shown, in addition, that the oil discharged was in harmful quantities, re-
quiring a case by case determination. Similar language in the U.S.'s CWA,
prior to its amendment was interpreted to require a showing that a dis-
charge caused actual harm before liability could attach to that dis-
charge.210 This task is overwhelming for the enforcement agency given the
large number of spills and other constraints of the regulatory agency.2 0 4
The U.S. CWA's formula of "quantities as may be harmful" is a better
approach as it gives the regulatory agency authority to determine what is
prohibited by some general and verifiable yardstick not requiring an elab-
orate or case by case inquiry.10 5
Second, the scope of FEPA and, consequently, its mandate are re-
stricted to "waters of Nigeria" which are defined by the Act to mean all
water sources in any form which are 1) "inter-state, 2) in the Federal
Capital Territory, 3) territorial waters of Nigeria, 4) within the Exclusive
Economic Zone, or 5) in any other area under the jurisdiction of the
Nigerian Federal Government. '20 6 While this scope is considerably
199: § 20(5).
200. FEPA, GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION CONTROL IN
NIGERIA 214 (1991).
201. See supra notes 29-49 and accompanying text.
202. The Guidelines actually list some wastes from the refining process, e.g., slop oil
emulsion solids, tank bottoms (leaded), as dangerous waste. Supra note 195, at 178.
203. See supra 75-78 and accompanying text.
204. Infra notes 284-287 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
206. § 38.
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broader than that of the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, it does not appear
to cover many of the small interstate rivers, streams, and creeks which
continue to be polluted by oil and which serve the drinking and other
domestic needs of many of the communities in oil producing and refining
areas. It is actually these waters that are in more dire need of protection
given the substantial health risks posed by such pollution. It is doubtful
that the affected states have the resources to protect these waters. It is,
therefore, suggested that the scope of FEPA and its mandate be ex-
panded to cover all waters in Nigeria at least temporarily, until it is seen
that the states possess the ability and will to act.
The criminal liability under Section 20 also appears to be inadequate
because it exempts only discharges with permit or authorization."0 7 It is
hardly justifiable to impose criminal liability whenever there is a dis-
charge of hazardous substance, regardless of the cause, including a dis-
charge caused solely by, say, an act of God.2 0 8 The defenses available for
the civil liability include acts of war, acts of God, and sabotage. So that
the defense of sabotage cannot provide an easy escape route, the owner or
operator seeking to avail itself of this defense should be required to show
1) that it exercised due care with respect to the discharge concerned, 2)
that it took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any third
party, and 3) that it was aware of the foreseeable consequences of those
acts or omissions.20 " The defense of sabotage should also be restricted in
third party claims against the discharger. Sabotage should not be a total
bar to the discharger's liability to pay compensation to third parties for
whatever damage third parties suffered, except where the claimant is also
the saboteur. It is only fair that innocent third parties should be compen-
sated for damage arising from acts to which they did not contribute. The
operator carrying on economic activity for profit is in a better position to
bear such loss, but the operator should be given an express right of in-
demnification against the person causing the damage.21 0
207. But see Adewale, supra note 5, at 57-59. She suggested that the exemptions under
§ 20 incorporate the defenses under the Oil in Navigable Waters Act (ONWA) and, there-
fore, make the offenses anything but absolute. Id. It is doubtful that this was the intention
of the lawmaker. If it were so, it would have been absolutely unnecessary to specify the
defenses to § 21 liability since the liability does not arise unless the discharge is in violation
of § 20. The § 21 defenses are all (though in different words) contained in § 4, ONWA.
Further, it can hardly be said that the defenses under ONWA amount to a permit or au-
thorization to discharge oil into navigable waters. A permit or authorization, it is submitted,
connotes some positive conferment of a right to act as distinct from a defense which merely
shields a wrongdoer from punishment. By way of analogy, can it truly be said that a person
who is provoked has a permit to kill the person offering the provocation? Cf. with the case
of an executioner who has by law a permit or authority to carry out executions.
208. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
209. Cf. OPA 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
210. Id. at § 2702(d)(1)(B), CWA 33 U.S.C. § 1321(g). See Akpezi E. Ogbuigwe, Com-
pensation and Liability for Oil Pollution in Nigeria-Need for a Positive Approach, 3 J.
PRIVATE & PROP. L. 21, 31 (1985). Operators too frequently cite sabotage as an excuse for
non-payment of compensation. It is, however, recognized that sabotage is indeed a problem
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As noted earlier, the liability of the owner or operator extends to
payment of costs to third parties in the form of restoration, restitution, or
compensation but only "as may be determined by [FEPA]." It is not clear
why this restriction was included, but it is clear that the fate of the many
victims of oil pollution in Nigeria might turn on the manner in which
FEPA discharges this trust. It is probably too early to pass judgment but
after nearly seven years,211 victims of oil pollution in Nigeria continue to
go without any form of compensation, and, where any is paid, it is usually
inadequate.212 Their plight has been exacerbated by the absence of clear
provisions in the statutes giving them a right of action against the pol-
luters. The FEPA Act does not appear to have departed markedly from
this tradition; nor does it create a right for the victim which can be en-
forced directly against the polluter, absent a prior determination by
FEPA of the amount of compensation, if any, that the victim is entitled
to be paid.218
Finally, pursuant to the FEPA Act, certain regulations have been
promulgated governing several aspects of environmental care in the in-
dustries generally including the oil industry.2 14 Those relevant to the oil
industry are the National Environmental Protection (Effluent Limitation)
Regulations 21 5 and the National Environmental Protection (Pollution
Abatement in Industries and Facilities Generating Wastes) Regula-
tions,216 both enacted in 1991. The former establishes effluent limitations
for all categories of industries. For the petroleum industry, the regula-
tions allow an oil and grease content in brine and other production wastes
in Nigeria, but the operators and the government should double their efforts to get sabo-
teurs prosecuted under existing laws rather than make innocent parties bear the loss.
211. Cf. Adewale, supra note 5, at 59-60 (expressing optimism that this FEPA's author-
ity would signal the end of the hardship suffered by victims of oil pollution).
212. Gberesu, The Concept of Fair and Adequate Compensation in Nigerian Oil In-
dustry, in THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY AND THE NIGERIAN ENVIRONMENT 1987, supra note 21,
at 48. In one spill incident which involved about 23.9 million gallons of crude oil, the af-
fected villagers received a mere 550,000 naira for loss of fishing rights. Odogwu, supra note
23, at 50.
213. § 21(1)(b).
214. This is in spite of the confusion created by § 23 over whether FEPA has the au-
thority to regulate the oil industry. The section provides that FEPA "shall cooperate" with
the Department of Petroleum Resources "for the removal of oil related pollutants dis-
charged into the Nigerian environment and play such supportive role" as the Department
may from time to time request from it. The question has been whether this section retains
the exclusive authority of the Department of Petroleum Resources to regulate the petroleum
industry including environmental aspects, thereby leaving FEPA to play only a supportive
role as may be requested by the Department. See Adewale, supra note 5, at 63 (concluding
that the Department is still in charge of environmental regulation in the oil industry but
called for a review of the provisions). However, this paper has proceeded on the assumption
that FEPA also has authority to regulate the oil industry, relegated only in matters pertain-
ing to removal of oil related pollutants.
215. S.I. 8 of 1991.
216. S.I. 9 of 1991.
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of 10 mg/liter for discharge into inland waters.117 Violation attracts a fine
of 20,000 naira, two years imprisonment, or both. If the offense is com-
mitted by a corporation, the fine is 500,000 naira.218 An effluent limit of
10 mg/liter for oil and grease content is, indeed, a high standard, but it
does not appear to have taken into adequate consideration the almost
unique Nigerian situation where the inland surface waters serve many of
the communities for drinking and other domestic purposes without any
form of treatment. 19 An outright ban on discharge of brine and other
production wastes into inland waters would be more desirable and, ac-
cordingly, is recommended.2 0
The National Environmental Protection (Pollution Abatement in In-
dustries Generating Wastes) Regulations also directly impact the petro-
leum industry. Regulation 1 states that no industry or facility shall re-
lease "hazardous or toxic substances into the air, water or land of
Nigeria's ecosystems beyond limits approved" by FEPA.221 More specifi-
cally, regulation 15(2) provides: "no oil, in any form, shall be discharged
into public drains, rivers, lakes, sea, or underground injection without a
permit issued by [FEPA] or any organization designated by [it]. ' ' 222 This
is an outright ban on the discharge of oil into the specified water sources
and does not seem to depend on other considerations such as whether the
oil is of harmful quantity. The Regulations also restate the restriction on
the discharge of effluents with constituents beyond specified limits, and
provide, though scantily, for contingency planning by all industries and
facilities against accidental release of pollutants. 23 The penalty for viola-
tion of these regulations is the same as with the Effluent Limitation
Regulations. 22
4. Other Legislation
In addition to the enactments already discussed, other Nigerian legis-
lation has some relevance to the subject of oil pollution of water. Worthy
217. Schedule 3.
218. Reg. 5, adopting the penalties specified in §§ 35 and 36 of the enabling FEPA Act.
219. With a 10 mg/l effluent limit for oil, produced water from some oil fields in Nigeria
would fairly easily qualify for discharge into inland surface waters without any form of
treatment. For instance, it has been demonstrated that brine from the Obagi Field contains
a little less than 10 mg/l of oil and could, therefore, be discharged into the nearby Orashi
river even though the river is the source of drinking water for the neighboring communities.
See B.S. Uhuegbulem & H.N. Dala, Handling of Production Effluents in Freshwater Envi-
ronment: The Obagi Experience, in THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY AND THE NIGERIAN ENVIRON-
MENT 108, 114-15 (1989).
220. Cf. Murday et al., Oil Pollution Control in Nigeria: Legal and Enforcement Con-
siderations, in THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY AND THE NIGERIAN ENVIRONMENT, supra note 21,
at 54, 58 (suggesting that the discharge of produced water in swamps be banned for "new
sources" while a compliance schedule should be developed for "existing sources").
221. Reg 15(1).
222. Reg. 15(2).
223. Regs. 7 and 8.
224. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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of mention are the Oil Pipelines Act225 and the Criminal Code.226
The Oil Pipelines Act, enacted in 1956, is one of the earliest pieces of
legislation on the subject of oil pollution and, perhaps, the only one that
uidoubtedly confers a right of action to victims of oil pollution from
pipelines and other ancillary installations. Section 11(5) provides, in part,
as follows:
The holder of a licence shall pay compensation ... ; (c) to any person
suffering damage (other than on account of his own default or on ac-
count of the malicious act of a third person) as a consequence of any
breakage of or leakage from the pipeline or an ancillary installation. If
the amount of such compensation is not agreed between any such per-
son and the holder, it shall be fixed by a court in accordance with Part
IV of this Act. 27
Claimants have a fairly great chance of success under this subsection,
since it does not require them to establish negligence on the part of the
pipeline license holder. In other words, it creates strict liability for the
license holder.2 ' Ironically, this is one provision of the law that has been
seriously underutilized by claimants. There is just no clear reason for this,
but one probable reason is insufficient knowledge on the part of the
claimants and their counsel.22 9 In one of the very few cases where the
subsection served as the basis for an award of damages, it was the judge
who suo motu resorted to it after determining that the tort of negligence
and the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, relied on by the plaintiffs, were
inapplicable. 2 s0
The Criminal Code applies to any person who "corrupts or fouls the
water of any spring, stream, well, tank, reservoir, or place, so as to render
it less fit for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used." A party guilty of
this offence is punishable with imprisonment for up to six months."'
Similarly, Section 247 states that any person who "vitiates" the atmo-
sphere in any place so as to make it noxious to the health of persons or
who does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to
be, likely to spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life, whether
human or animal, is guilty of an offense punishable with six months im-
prisonment. These provisions are without doubt applicable to oil pollu-
tion of water, as well as other forms of environmental degradation, but
the penalty of imprisonment provided by the Code is highly inappropri-
225. Laws of the Federation, Cap. 338 (1990).
226. Id. Cap. 77.
227. The said Part IV lists some of the factors to be considered by the court in assess-
ing the amount of compensation.
228. Ikpede v. Shell BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. M.W.S.J. 61
(1973).
229. J.A. Omotola, The Quantum of Compensation for Oil Pollution: An Overview, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS IN NIGERIA, supra note 50, 285, 306.
230. Ikpede's case, M.W.S.J. 61.
231. § 245.
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ate for corporate offenders.
Finally, regarding statutory enactments, the Harmful Waste (Special
Criminal Provisions) Act, 1988.982 Section 1 prohibits the "purchase, sale,
importation, transit, transportation, deposit, [and] storage of harmful
wastes" and makes it a crime to engage in any of these activities without
lawful authority. The penalty for contravention is stern: 1) imprisonment
for life and 2) forfeiture to the Federal Government of any carrier used in
the transportation or importation of the harmful waste and any land on
which the waste was deposited or dumped. " "Harmful waste" is broadly
defined to mean any "injurious, poisonous, toxic, or noxious substance."
This could be construed to cover oil pollutants considering their injurious
or toxic nature,' but it is doubtful if the lawmakers intended this enact-
ment to apply to the oil industry, particularly considering the legislative
history.8 5 The Act was a swift reaction to the dumping of toxic waste by
an Italian firm in the port town of Koko in 19888 6 and was intended to
deter any similar actions, especialy given the increasing rates of trans-
boundary movement of radioactive and other hazardous wastes to devel-
oping countries.237
5. Common Law Liability
As observed earlier, most of the statutes and regulations in force in
Nigeria do not confer any right of private action on the victims of oil
pollution. As a consequence, claims have generally been brought as com-
mon law tort claims. The more usual theories of tort relied on are negli-
gence, nuisance, and the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. Each of these has its
severe limitations as shown by some of the cases.288
232. Cap. 165 Laws of the Federation, (1990).
233. Id., § 6.
234. See supra notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
235. IBIDAPO-OBE, supra note 187, at 250.
236. See press briefing by Nigeria's Minister of External Affairs on the matter. DAILY
TIMES (Nigeria), June 15, 1988, at 1; Sylvia F. Liu, The Koko Incident: Developing Interna-
tional Norms for the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, 8 J. NAT. RESOUCE.S
& ENV'T. L. 121 (1993).
237. The concerns aroused by those incidents led to the Basel Convention on the Con-
trol of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal, 28 I.L.M. 649
(1989), and the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, 30 I.L.M. 773 (1991). The
latter was adopted by Organization of African Unity member states following their concern
that the Basel Convention did not include a total ban. For a consideration of the issues, see
Mary Critharis, Note, Third World Nations are Down in the Dumps: The Exportation of
Hazardous Waste, 16 BROOK J. INT'L L. 311 (1990); C. Russel H. Shearer, Comparative
Analysis of the Basel and Bamako Conventions on Hazardous Waste, 23 ENVTL. L. REP.
141 (1993); Maureen Walsh, The Global Trade in Hazardous Wastes: Domestic and Inter-
national Attempts to Cope with a Growing Crisis in Waste Management, 42 CATH. U. L.
REV. 103 (1992).
238. See generally E.N.U. Uzodike, Tort Law in the Oil Industry, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS IN NIGERIA, supra note 50, at 237; T. Osipitan, Problems of Proof in Environmental
Litigation, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS IN NIGERIA, supra note 50, at 112.
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For claims brought under negligence, which requires the claimant to
establish the existence of a duty of care, the breach of the duty and a
causal link between the breach and the injury suffered 89 the main diffi-
culty for the plaintiffs remains the showing of absence of the elements of
reasonable care on the part of the operator. In a highly technical industry
such as the petroleum industry, proof of negligence requires expert scien-
tific evidence unavailable and unaffordable to the largely unschooled and
poor victims of oil pollution in Nigeria. In Atubin v. Shell BP Petroleum
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd,2 4 0 in which the plaintiffs claimed
that the defendant caused crude oil, gas, and chemicals to escape from
pipelines under their control thereby destroying fishes in the lake and
their farmland, the court held that the plaintiffs did not prove that de-
fendant was negligent. 41 Though the courts, may at times, invoke the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur'4 s to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of
establishing defendant's negligence, the inference is rebuttable by expert
evidence showing that the defendant took the utmost care and acted in
accordance with standard industry practices. The oil polluters in Nigeria
are well positioned, considering the enormous resources at their disposal,
to supply the expert evidence in rebuttal, and the Nigerian courts have
established that such expert evidence, if unchallenged, must be accepted
and acted upon by the trial court.2 4
The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher has provided greater succor to claim-
ants, since the cases show a willingness by the courts to hold operators in
the oil industry liable on the basis of the rule. The rule is one of strict
liability not requiring any showing of negligence on the part of the de-
fendant.2 44 The plaintiff only needs to prove: 1) that there was an "es-
cape" from defendant's land of anything likely to do mischief, 2) that
there was a "non-natural user" of the land, and 3) that the plaintiff suf-
fered damage as a result of the "escape." ' 48 In Umudje v. Shell BP Petro-
leum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd,2 41 the plaintiffs claimed
damages for the "escape" of oil-waste from a pit in the control of the
defendants which resulted in damage to plaintiffs' ponds, lakes, and
farmlands. The Supreme Court held the defendant company liable for the
damage to plaintiffs' property under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. Sim-
239. Donoghue v. Stevenson App. Cas. 562 (1932).
240. Suit No. UHC/48/73, Judgment of the Ughelli High Court delivered on November
12, 1974, (Unreported).
241. See also Chinda v. Shell BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd 2
R.S.L.R. 1 (1974) (holding that the plaintiffs could not establish any negligence in the de-
fendant's operation of its flare sites which caused enormous damage to plaintiffs' crops,
land, and houses). The plaintiffs in Atubin's case could have successfully maintained an
action under § 11(5), Oil Pipelines Act (discussed above).
242. The doctrine raises a prima facie presumption of negligence against a defendant.
243. Seismograph Services Ltd. v. Akpornovo 6 S.C. 119, 135, (Nigeria S. Ct.) (1974).
244. Rylands v. Fletcher (1866) L.R. 1 Exch. 265, 277-280, affd by the House of Lords,
(1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 338-340.
245. Id.
246. (1975) 9-11 S.C. 155 (Nigeria S.Ct.).
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ilarly, in Edhemowe v. Shell BP Petroleum Development Company of
Nigeria Ltd,4" the court held the defendant liable for damage caused to
plaintiffs fish pond by the oil which escaped from the defendant's waste
pit, holding that the accumulation of crude oil in a waste pit was a non-
natural user of land.
In spite of the higher chances of success by plaintiffs with the rule in
Rylands,'" it must be noted that the courts have accepted statutory au-
thority as a complete defense to a claim brought under the rule. Accord-
ingly, in Ikpede v. Shell BP Petroleum Development Company of Nige-
ria Ltd,'4 ' where leakage of crude oil from defendant's pipelines caused
damage to plaintiffs' fish swamp, the court held that even though all the
requirements of the rule in Rylands' case were met, the defendant could
not be held liable under the rule since its act of laying pipelines was done
pursuant to a license issued under the Oil Pipelines Act.28 0 Some com-
mentators have expressed doubts on the appropriateness of applying the
rule in Rylands' case to oil operations in Nigeria, asking whether oil oper-
ations could actually be considered non-natural users of land.25 1 Such
doubts are legitimate since it is difficult to see how oil operations could
amount to non-natural user of land in a country whose fortune is almost
entirely dependent on earnings from oil.252 However, the utilization of the
rule might be defended as an effort by Nigerian courts to regulate oil
pollution and provide relief to victims in the absence of any other basis
247. Suit No. UHC/12/70, judgment of the Ughelli High Court delivered on January 29,
1971 (unreported).
248. Other cases where the rule was accepted by the courts as the basis for their deci-
sions include Otuku v. Shell BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. Suit No.
BHC/2/83, judgment of the Bori High Court delivered on January 15, 1985 (unreported);
Okoro v. Shell BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. Suit No. W/21/72,
judgment of the Warri High Court delivered on November 27, 1972 (unreported).
249. Rylands, L.R. 1 Exch., at 273. In Umudje's case, the Supreme Court indicated that
it would have been prepared to accept the defense of statutory authority had any existed in
that case.
250. The court, however, awarded damages to the plaintiffs on the basis of the strict
liability provisions of the Oil Pipelines Act. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
251. See Adewale, Rylands v. Fletcher, supra note 165, at 40-42; Uzodike, supra note
238, at 245; Omorogbe, supra note 165, at 155.
252. In the U.S., the rule is not uniformly applied in all states. For instance, the courts
in Texas and Oklahoma have rejected the rule holding that the use of land for oil and gas
operations in those states was not an unnatural use. See Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128
Tex. 155, 166 (1936); Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309, 313
(1974); Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Strell, 190 Okla. 344, 124 P.2d 255 (1942). On the other
hand, the rule has been utilized in some states such as Kansas, Utah and Indiana as a basis
for recovery of damages from oil and gas operations. See Wendtlandt v. National Coopera-
tive Refinery Assn., 215 P.2d 209 (1950); John T. Arnold Assoc., Inc. v. City of Wichita, 615
P.2d 814, 823-26 (Kan. App. 1980); Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 274-75
(Utah 1982); Mowrer v. Ashland Oil and Refinery Co., 518 F.2d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1975). The
Rylands v. Fletcher rule seems to have been accepted in Canada as applicable to operations
in the oil and gas industry. See London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Northwestern Utili-
ties (1936) App. Cas. 108 (a Privy Council decision dealing with gas pollution in Alberta),
Lohndorf v. British American Oil Company (1958) 24 W.W.R. 193, 196.
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for relief. After all, the rule, being one of common law, is not immutable
and is subject to modifications to meet the needs of a changing society.
Nuisance has also been used as a basis for claims against oil polluters
but less frequently than negligence. It has two major drawbacks. First,
the tort of private nuisance protects property interests, and is, therefore,
unlikely to be available to plaintiffs claiming personal injury as a result of
oil pollution.538 Second, it appears that most acts of nuisance committed
by oil companies affecting water would be regarded as public nuisances
which are actionable only by the Attorney General. Since such acts affect
the public as a whole, no single individual can sue under the tort of nui-
sance unless he can show that he suffered special damages, peculiar to
himself. In Amos v. Shell BP Petroleum Development Company of Nige-
ria Ltd,264 an action brought by the plaintiffs for and on behalf of 42
villages, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, in the course of oil min-
ing operations, built a large earth dam across their creek which caused
serious flooding upstream and the drying up of the creek downstream.
They claimed, as a result, their farms were flooded and damaged, the
movement of canoes, the main means of transportation, was hampered,
and their agricultural and commercial life was paralyzed. The court dis-
missed the action holding that the creek was a public waterway and its
blocking was a public nuisance for which the plaintiffs could not sue in
the absence of any proof that they suffered any damage over and above
that of the general public.2 55 The court also held that the plaintiffs could
not maintain a representative action for special damages because the
losses were suffered separately and each individual must plead and prove
his or her special individual loss.
C. International Law
As alluded to earlier, there are rules of international law which im-
pact the subject of oil pollution of water. However, international regula-
253. See Thompson-Schwabb v. Costaki (1956) 1 W.L.R. 335, 338.
254. 4 E.C.S.L.R. 86 (1974), aff'd 6 S.C. 109 (1977).
255. Nigerian courts have been too willing to hold that acts which affect more than one
person amount to public nuisance thereby denying any of the victims right to sue. Unfortu-
nately, the Attorney-General has not been known to be enthusiastic to enforce such public
rights. See Lawani v. The West African Portland Cement Co., (1973) 3 U.I.L.R. (Part IV)
459 (a class action by inhabitants of five villages for damage to their crops, buildings and
other properties arising from the operations of the defendant's cement factory was dis-
missed on the ground that the injuries amounted to public nuisance). In the U.S., the di-
chotomy between private and public nuisance is, of course, recognized, but the courts do not
label an act one or the other merely on the basis of the number of people who are injured by
the act complained of. In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures, 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed. 2d 254 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
in determining the issue of standing, it is of no consequence that many people suffer the
injury. The Court noted that to deny standing to individuals who are injured simply because
many others are also injured would mean that the more injurious government actions could
be questioned by nobody. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group
Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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tion of oil pollution is one area in which the United States has not enthu-
siastically participated withi the result that the U.S. is not party to most
of the major multi-lateral treaties on the subject. M Reasons suggested for
this lukewarm attitude include the lower levels of liability allowed under
the international conventions and the possibility of preemption of state
liability laws.1 57 There seems little prospect for any change in this atti-
tude, since ratifying the conventions would entail reopening some of the
domestic legislation, particularly the Oil Pollution Act, which is unlikely
now or in the near future.2 5 8
Somewhat curiously, the U.S. was the first state to ratify the Conven-
tion on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation." 9 The
convention went into force in May, 1995, having been ratified by at least
15 countries,2 6 0 including Nigeria. It protects the marine environment
from oil spills and provides for planning, reporting procedures, technol-
ogy sharing, and cooperation.26 1 The OPRC requires parties to establish
national systems for preparedness and response.
262
Nigeria is a party to the 1969 International Convention on Civil Lia-
bility for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC)'6s and the 1971 Convention on the
256. The treaties include the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
1969, revised by the Protocols of 1976, 1984, and 1992; the Convention on the Establishment
of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, revised by the
Protocols of 1984 and 1992; and the Law of the Sea Convention, 1982.
257. See Cooney, supra note 137, at 346 n. 13, 356-58; Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note
120, at 24; Gary B. Conine, Environmental Issues in Offshore Exploration and Production
Activities, 42 INST. OmL & GAS L. & TAX'N 8-1, 8-46 to 8-47 (1991).
258. See William DiBenedetto, Little Chance for Any Changes to Pollution Act, JOUR-
NAL or COM., Dec. 23, 1992, at lB. Admiral Kime, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, probably
summed up U.S. thinking in a speech to the Propeller Club of the United States (Feb. 23,
1993): "Let's face it, Congress has voted. The vote was 535-0. Pigs will fly before the U.S.
ratifies the 1984 Protocols." Id. (quoted in GIBsON, supra note 55, at 27). Note that the
OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2761(d) mandates the Interagency Committee to coordinate and cooperate
with other nations and foreign research entities in conducting oil pollution research develop-
ment and demonstration activities. Further, OPA § 3001 recognizes that "it is in the best
interests of the United States to participate in an international pollution liability and com-
pensation regime that is at least as effective as" United States law in preventing incidents
and guaranteeing full and prompt compensation. President Bush, while signing the OPA,
issued a statement in which he recognized the "global challenge" of oil pollution and urged
the Senate to give immediate consideration to ratifying the 1984 Protocols. "[T]he solutions
we devise must be broad enough to address the needs of all nations." Statement by Presi-
dent George Bush upon signing H.R. 1465, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1265-66, Aug. 27,
1990.
259. 30 I.L.M. 733 (1991). Perhaps, as a further sign of things to come, the Coast Guard
took steps recently to align U.S. domestic transport rules with Regulation 26 of Annex 1 of
MARPOL 73/78 by adopting final rules requiring U.S. flag vessels of more than 400 gross
tons and U.S. flag oil tankers of more than 150 gross tons to carry approved oil spill re-
sponse plans. 59 FED. REG 51,332 (1994).
260. Article 16 provides for entry into force twelve months after fifteen ratifications.
261. Articles 3, 4.
262. Articles I(1), 6.
263. 973 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970).
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Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage (FUND).2 " The purpose of the CLC is to provide uniform
international rules and procedures for determining questions of liability
and providing adequate compensation for persons who suffer damage
caused by pollution resulting from escape or discharge of oil from ships.
It makes the owner of a ship, from which there is a discharge, liable for
the resulting damage26 up to specified limits. 2 "66 The FUND, which is
supplementary to the CLC, establishes the International Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund to provide compensation for pollution damage to the
extent that the protection afforded by the CLC is inadequate and to give
effect to other related purposes.
2 7
It is doubtful if victims of oil pollution in Nigeria have had any
meaningful benefit from these conventions. The reason, of course, is that
the conventions apply solely to discharge from ships, which has not really
been of critical concern in Nigeria, even though it does constitute a real
problem in the country's coastline.268 Further, there has not been any do-
mestic legislation promulgated to make the provisions of the conventions
enforceable internally.
Also, of some relevance to Nigeria, is the Law of the Sea Convention
which came into force recently. 6 9 The convention imposes on parties a
primary obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment, 2 0
while at the same time recognizing their right to exploit their natural re-
sources pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with
the primary obligation.2 7 ' The parties undertake individually and jointly
to take measures necessary to prevent, reduce, or control pollution of
marine environment from any source, using the "best practicable means
at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities. 2 7 2
264. 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 284 (1972).
265. Article III(1).
266. Under Article V(1), the liability of the ship owner for any one incident is limited
as follows: (a) 3 million units of account for a ship not exceeding 5,000 units of tonnage; (b)
for a ship in excess thereof, 420 units of account for each additional unit of tonnage up to a
limit of 59.7 million units of account. Id. However, under Article V(2), there is no limit to
liability where an act or omission of the owner was committed with the intent to cause the
pollution damage arising or recklessly with knowledge that such damage would probably
result. (A unit of account is approximately $1.43). These limits of liability are as revised by
the 1984 Protocol.
267. Article 2.
268. See ETKERENTSE, supra note 2, at 80 (stating that much of the oil found along
Nigeria's coastline comes from ocean-going tankers).
269. U.N. Doc. A/Conf./62/122. After so many years of waiting, the Convention finally
came into force on Nov. 16, 1994. Nigeria ratified it on August 14, 1986. Though the U.S. is
not yet a party to the Convention, it is hoped that it would soon take the necessary steps to
ratify it, its principal objections (relating to Part XI of the Convention) having been allevi-
ated by virtue of the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS of
G.A. Res. 48/263, U.N. Doc. A/48/950 (1994).
270. Article 192.
271. Article 193.
272. Article 194(1).
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V. ASSESSMENT
The regulatory laws in the United States and Nigeria, as summarized
in the foregoing sections, have clear strengths and weaknesses. The fol-
lowing discussion suggests an appropriate tool and focus for enhancing
the strengths and minimizing the weaknesses of these oil pollution related
laws.
A. General Observations
The pre-FEPA (1988) regulatory regime in Nigeria is, in theory and
practice, plagued with so many shortcomings that there is a temptation to
write it off as non-existent. Even FEPA did not change much in practice.
First, FEPA, or Nigerian law in general, to a very large extent did not set
any specific standards for the oil operators to meet in order to protect
and preserve the water sources and the environment in Nigeria. The stat-
utes and regulations are couched in such general and imprecise terms that
they make compliance and enforcement nearly impossible. For illustra-
tion, there was nothing in any of Nigeria's oil-related laws, outside of the
Oil in Navigable Waters Act,217 that prohibited the discharge of oil or
waste into the environment.274 Nigerian law only enjoins operators to ex-
ercise care in order to prevent spills. They are required to adopt "good
oilfield practice," take "all practicable precautions," carry out their oper-
ations in a "proper and workmanlike manner," and, in the event of a
spill, "control and, if possible, end it. '217 It is extremely difficult to deter-
mine the nature of any obligations created by such vague expressions. 7 6
The FEPA Act and the regulations made under it appear, to a large ex-
tent, to address this shortcoming by enacting a prohibition of discharge of
"hazardous substance" into or upon water and by setting specific stan-
dards in certain aspects of the operations in the oil industry to protect
the integrity of the "waters of Nigeria. 
9
277
Another shortcoming of the Nigerian laws is the wide discretion usu-
ally given to the implementing agencies. For the most part, the statutes
authorize a government official, usually a minister, to make regulations
without setting any time frame within which such assignment is to be
carried out and in language that suggests that the official has a choice
273. The restricted scope of the Act, the soft penalties and the many defenses allowed
make the Act a nearly worthless piece of legislation. See supra notes 180-191 and accompa-
nying text.
274. Rather, there are provisions which seem to suggest that operators have authority
to cause damage but "as little ... as possible." Reg. 36 of the Petroleum (Drilling and
Production) Regulations provides in part as follows: "The licensee or lessee [shall] take all
steps practicable ... (e) to cause as little damage as possible to the surface of the relevant
area and to the trees, crops, buildings, structures and other property thereon." Id.
275. Emphasis added. See supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
277. But see supra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
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whether or not to make such regulations. 78 This could be contrasted with
most of the provisions in U.S. law which contain definite directives to
make appropriate regulations within a given time frame.17 9 Environmen-
tal protection laws regarding the Nigerian oil industry must be made to
reflect this stronger U.S. approach. Nigerian laws must be changed to
have mandates, modes, and times for carrying out such laws."'0
Compounding the wide discretion given to the implementing agencies
is the vague nature of the power granted the Department of Petroleum
Resources (DPR or Department), the main regulatory agency. For exam-
ple, the regulations in several places require that oil operator practices
and equipment should be approved by the Director of the DPR.2 s8 Here,
it is onerous to interpret what the language means.
Is one entitled to assume that the operators' practice, for example, of
discharging brine or equipment into inland waters,"8 ' some of which are
outdated and the failure of which contributes significantly to the oil pol-
lution problem in Nigeria, 88 received the prior approval or acceptance of
the Director? Or is it a case of the Director's failing to insist on his prior
approval or acceptance of such practices and equipment as required by
law?
Whichever is the case, the role of giving prior approval or acceptance
to all practices and equipment used in the oil industry is not a proper one
for the DPR for several reasons. First, it is doubtful if the Department
has the necessary expertise and facilities to fulfill that mandate. 8 4 Sec-
ond, it places the Department in an awkward position, since most spills in
Nigeria are caused by practices or equipment supposedly prescribed or
approved by the Department.
Given these regulatory flaws, it is difficult to determine categorically
who is more blame for the current state of environmental degradation
caused by oil production, namely transportation and refinement in Nige-
ria, the Department, or the operators. The latter might even be partly
responsible for the Department's unwillingness to enforce the law against
the spillers.2 8 5 The proper role for the department and other agencies
should be to set and enforce the standards to protect the Nigerian envi-
ronment and leave the industry to devise ways and means of attaining
those standards.
278. The statutory provisions usually state as follows: "The minister may make regula-
tions .... See, e.g., Sec. 5 Oil in Navigable Waters Act; § 9 Petroleum Act; § 37 FEPA Act.
279. See, e.g., CWA 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(2)(B), 1321(j)(6), OPA 33 U.S.C. §§ 2704(d),
2706(e)(1).
280. Akanle, supra note 163, at 6, 28.
281. See, e.g., Regs. 7, 27, 43 of the Petroleum Refining Regulations, regs. 25, 36, 40 of
the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations.
282. Nwankwo & Irrechukwu, supra note 5, at 103.
283. See supra notes 12 and 20.
284. Nwankwo & Irrechukwu, supra note 5, at 105.
285. See infra notes 288-290 and accompanying text.
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Yet another shortcoming of the regulatory regime in Nigeria is the
laughably inadequate sanctions provided for in most of the statutes and
regulations. What effect, for instance, does a fine of a hundred naira or
$4.55 mean to an oil operator for breach of environmental regulations?
Clearly, the sanctions, except perhaps those in the FEPA Act,"8 ' are not
stiff enough to be a deterrent. To be effective, regulations must induce
compliance. Thus, it is critical that new regulations be developed to in-
corporate penalties and enforcement provisions that create strong incen-
tives for compliance.8 7
A much more fundamental objection is the neglect or unwillingness
of the regulatory agencies to enforce the existing regulations. This ap-
pears to be the main bane of Nigeria's environmental regulation of the oil
industry rather than the absence of rules. Despite the several reported
cases of oil spills in Nigeria, there has not been a single known case of
enforcement of the statutes and regulations against the culprits.28s The
neglect or failure of the regulatory agencies to apply the stipulated sanc-
tions has been consistent and remarkable and creates the impression of
complicity and support for the oil companies with sloppy production
practices. This contrasts sharply with the enthusiastic enforcement in the
United States of relevant sanctions through criminal, civil, and adminis-
trative penalties. Over the last decade, the use of criminal sanctions for
violations of U.S. environmental laws has increased dramatically; so have
the penalties.2 8 9 Many prosecutions are against individuals working for
corporations. The extension of criminal liability to individuals who act for
the corporate entity will provide a potent incentive to ensure that envi-
ronmental laws are complied with and that environmental concerns are
addressed in a prompt and forthright manner.2 90 The selfish desire to pro-
tect one's own liberty converts, at least in theory, every employee and
company manager into a motivated environmental protectionist.
The Nigerian agencies are urged to emulate the enforcement scheme
in the United States recognizing that they may, indeed, be faced with
some genuine constraints, including budget facilities, personnel compe-
286. See supra notes 195, 196, and 218 and accompanying text.
287. See PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 984
(1992).
288. 0. A. Bowen, The Role of Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Environmental
Laws, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS IN NIGERIA, supra note 50, at 165.
289. See GIBSON, supra note 55, at 20. Statistics of criminal prosecutions for environ-
mental crimes by the U.S. Department of Justice for the fiscal year 1983 through fiscal year
1993 showed a total of 1,081 indictments (329 corporations and 752 individuals); 804 convic-
tions (258 corporations and 546 individuals); a total of $253,632,917 in fines and 417 years of
imprisonment. United States Department of Justice Memorandum Re: Environmental
Criminal Statistics Fiscal Year 83 through FY92, cited in Linda C. Martin, Environmental
Crimes: What You Don't Know Can Send You to Jail, 2-4, (paper presented at a seminar
on Basic Environmental Issues in the Oil Patch, College of Law, University of Tulsa (June
17, 1994)).
290. David E. Pierce & John S. Lowe, SHORT COURSE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR THE
OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 119-120 (Seminar Materials, University of Tulsa (Dec. 6-7, 1994)).
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tencies, and the role of government in the oil industry. All petroleum re-
sources in Nigeria are vested in the Federal Government"9 ' which in turn
enters into operating agreements, usually joint ventures,2 9 2 between the
operating companies and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC), a state oil corporation. Consequently, the costs for pollution
abatement must be borne by both the operating companies and the state
as it does not seem the government is willing to pay its share s.2 9  Until
1988, the Department of Petroleum Resources, then known as the Petro-
leum Inspectorate, was an integral part of the NNPC but now forms a
part of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. Before 1988, the NNPC's
dual role of being both an operator and a regulator meant that enforce-
ment actions affected the NNPC; thus, it was hardly surprising that the
NNPC took no enforcement action which would have resulted in adverse
self-regulation.2 94
Compounding the problem of non-enforcement by the public agen-
cies is the lack of any mechanism for private enforcement of the statutes
and regulations in Nigeria.295 Conversely, nearly every major federal envi-
ronmental legislation in the United States has provisions for citizen
suits.296 U.S. law enables private citizens to bring actions against viola-
tors, and, more importantly, to compel the enforcement agencies to carry
out their non-discretionary statutory duties.297 Citizen suits are proven as
a very useful tool for environmental protection, because they stimulate
291. Constitution, Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, § 40.
292. The government now seems to prefer the production-sharing contract to the joint
venture agreements because under the former the government is not required to contribute
towards the exploration and production costs. Nigeria reviews Oil- drilling law, DEUTSCHE
PRESSE AGENTUR, Nov. 4, 1994, (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File).
293. See Omorogbe, supra note 165, at 162. It is hoped that the current shift away from
joint venture agreements to production-sharing contracts will minimize the constraint posed
by government's inability or failure to contribute to pollution abatement costs.
294. Akanle, supra note 165, at 16.
295. See generally, Bowen, supra note 288.
296. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8; Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7604; CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659; Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136, seems to be the
only principal exception.
297. But the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have signalled a change in direction in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) in which it held that the citizen suit
provision in the Endangered Species Act was unconstitutional for granting standing that
exceeded the Constitutional limits of Article III. For reactions to the case and suggestions
for alternative strategies, see Harold Feld, Saving the Citizen Suit: The Effect of Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife and the Role of Citizen Suits in Environmental Enforcement, 19
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). Earlier in 1987, the Supreme
Court had interpreted § 1365(a)(1) of the CWA rather restrictively to confer jurisdiction
only in cases of ongoing violations and denying jurisdiction for wholly past violations.
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundations, 484 U.S. 49 (1987). The relevant
part of the provisions authorizes citizens to bring suits against any person "who is alleged to
be in violation" of applicable standards, limitations, or orders. For a critique of the decision,
see Rodgers, supra note 20, at 289-290.
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and supplement government enforcement.2 98
In Nigeria, by contrast, the absence of statutory provisions permit-
ting private rights of action has left the common law as the only refuge
for victims of oil pollution who seek judicial remedies.29 But because of
the numerous drawbacks associated with common law tort actions,3 00 the
victims' chances of success of recovering any substantial and meaningful
remedy are slim. The claimants are thus constrained, to accept whatever
compensation is offered to them by the polluting oil companies, no matter
how grossly and ostensibly inadequate those offers might be.301 The
Nigerian courts make the alternative option of litigation even more unat-
tractive because of the paltry awards they give in the few cases that suc-
ceed. For instance, in Mon v. Shell BP Petroleum Development Com-
pany of Nigeria Ltd.,302 the court found that the spillage from the
defendant's pipelines caused enormous damage to the plaintiffs' fish pond
but awarded only two hundred naira as damages for the plaintiffs' loss.
In another case,3 0 3 the court merely awarded the exact amount initially
offered by the defendant but rejected earlier by the plaintiffs.
The attitude of the Nigerian courts, as exemplified in the cases just
cited, is in sharp contrast with the disposition of the American courts
towards awards of punitive damages. In one of the several cases against
the Exxon Corporation arising from the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, the trial
court awarded $5 billion as punitive damages in favor of the plaintiffs
which included Alaskan fishermen and property owners.3 "
298. For instance, in October 1994 some environmental groups and a Congressman sued
the Coast Guard and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for failing to
issue oil spill prevention and damage assessment regulations within the period mandated by
the Oil Pollution Act (NRDC v. U.S. Coast Guard, DC ENY, no. 94-4892, 10/20/94, cited in
25 ENVTL. L. REP. 1277 (1994)). The private right of action created by the statutes was
initially to help enforce the law but the OPA, moving further than any other federal envi-
ronmental legislation before it, also authorizes the private citizen to sue for damages. See
supra note 120 and accompanying text.
299. Note, however, the right of action created by § 11(5), Oil Pipelines Act, albeit
limited to pollution arising from pipelines. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 238-255 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. The victims' poor economic condi-
tions, their ignorance, and the expensive and uncertain option of litigation are additional
reasons why the inadequate compensatory payments are accepted. Under current practice,
compensation is available only when there is actual physical damage to claimant's private
property; claims for loss or injury arising from dependence on commonly owned natural
resources such as water are not entertained. Osuno (Panel Discussion), in THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY, supra note 4, at 213.
302. (1970-72)1 R.S.L.R. 71.
303. Nweke v. Nigerian Agip Oil Company Ltd. (1976) 10 S.C. 101.
304. In re Exxon Valdez, DC Alaska, No. A89-0095-CV. The verdict was handed down
on Sept. 16, 1994, cited in 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 1029 (1994). Similarly, in Marshall v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1989), the court awarded over $5 million in dam-
ages for injury resulting from defendants' improper plugging of a poor well even though an
official of the regulatory agency had witnessed and "approved the plugging as proper."
Nigerian courts generally seem not given to awarding huge damages in tort cases. See H.
Ogunniran, Awarding Exemplary Damages in Tort Cases: The Dilemma of Nigerian
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Apart from the insufficient damage awards given to successful claim-
ants in oil spill cases, Nigerian courts also never grant injunctive reme-
dies. In balancing the harms, the courts always put the need for continu-
ous oil operations, and, consequently, the pecuniary benefits to the
operating company and the country, above the need for the protection of
the environment, individuals' health and property."0 5 In Allar Iron v.
Shell BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd.,80 6 where the
plaintiff sought an injunction against continuing pollution of his land,
fishpond, and creek, the court denied the injunction inter alia on the
ground that "mineral oil is the main source of this country's revenue,"
and that a grant of injunction would render nugatory the oil exploration
license granted the defendant company. On the other hand, American
courts do, though seldomly grant injunctions in deserving cases in order
to protect the environment. In Amoco Production Co. v. Village of
Gambell, Alaska,80 7 the Supreme Court observed as follows:
Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately reme-
died by money damages and is often permanent or at leastof long du-
ration, that is, irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, there-
fore, the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of an
injunction to protect the environment. 08
Another pertinent observation about the U.S. regime is the level of
uncertainty caused by the existence of several sources of liability includ-
ing numerous federal statutes, state enactments, and common law. Rodri-
guez and Jaffe observe that "United States law regarding water pollution
is unusually confused, with overlapping statutes and common law reme-
dies on both the federal and state levels."109 This observation is still rele-
vant today, even considering the attempt by the OPA to minimize the
confusion with regard to liability at the federal level. It has been sug-
gested that the existence of the complex web of laws was caused in part
by the U.S. Congress's history of reacting to specific events rather than
Courts, 36 J. AFR. L. 111 (1992).
305. Kola Adeniji, Legal Control of Pollution Hazards from Petroleum Operations: Im-
plications for the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry, 12 GHANA U. L.J. 106, 118-19 (1975).
306. Judgment of the Warri High Court (unreported) (Nov. 26, 1973) Suit No. W/89/71.
307. 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
308. Id. at 545. However, the court refused to affirm the order of injunction made by
the Court of Appeals on the ground that no permanent damage was probable and that a
balance of harms favored a refusal of injunction. But in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978),
the Supreme Court authorized an injunction against the completion of a multi-million dollar
dam because the dam would threaten an endangered species of fish (snail darter), holding
that it was irrelevant that much money had been spent on the dam and that only little work
remained to be done. It should be pointed out, however, and the Court itself noted, that the
court considered its discretion in this case foreclosed by Congress and that only an injunc-
tion could vindicate the objectives of the law. Id. at 173. But see Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219 (1970), where the court in denying an injunction took into account,
among other factors, the fact that the cement plant was the core of the local economy.
309. Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 120, at 1.
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planning regulatory regimes.8 10
B. Focus
One feature common to the oil related law of both Nigeria and the
United States is the disproportionate emphasis placed on response. The
efforts seem to focus on "after-the-spill" consequences, such as liability,
compensation, and cleanup, rather than seeking to prevent the occurrence
of the spill in the first place. The one, and perhaps only notable, area
where the oil industry in Nigeria has demonstrated some concern for the
environment is in its preparations for response to oil spills. Every produc-
ing oil company has developed a first level response plan for minor spills
and a cooperative second level response plan for medium to major oil
spills, developed for spills beyond the response capability of individual oil
companies.311 In the United States, the OPA has been characterized as
"reactive" because its "primary provisions" are not implicated until a
spill occurs.3 12
It is the position of this article that the proper focus of the regulatory
regimes should be on spill prevention while treating the consequences of a
spill whenever it occurs as incidental. The response approach, no matter
how sophisticated, is not likely to provide any effective answer to the
problem of water pollution by oil. First, it has been shown that damage to
the environment from oil spills is immediate and generally short-term."'
Thus, even the quickest response after a spill is unlikely to prevent much
of the harm. Moreover, some of the components of oil, such as benzene
and naphthalene, are water soluble,.14 dissolving quickly in water, with
the result that even after an apparently effective cleanup, these compo-
nents could still remain in the water in harmful proportions.
Second, it is now beyond doubt that even the most thorough cleanup
is really never effective enough to remove all the spilled oil. For instance,
even the "extensive and thorough" 1 ' cleanup efforts by Exxon still left
approximately between 250,000 and 1.3 million gallons of oil in the Alas-
310. CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL., supra note 19, at 757-58.
311. The second level response is organized under the auspices of Clean Nigeria Associ-
ates (CNA), a cleanup cooperative of all the operating oil companies in Nigeria. The CNA
effectively came into being on Sept. 20, 1984 when it signed agreements with the cleaning
contractor Halliburton Ltd. with offices in Oklahoma, acting through its Nigerian
subsidiary.
312. D.L. Vickers, Note, Deterrence or Prevention Two Means of Environmental Pro-
tection: An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Oregon Senate Bill 242, 28
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 405, 431 (1992). Vickers argues that the OPA's focus on oil spill liabil-
ity, compensation and removal is "misguided" and criticizes that focus as the Act's Achilles'
heel. Id. at 419, 431.
313. BAKER, supra note 30, at 30. See also THE CONTROL OF OIL POLLUTION, supra note
15, at 50 (stating that there is "abundant evidence that freshly-spilled crude oils contain
low-boiling substances which are acutely toxic").
314. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
315. BAKER, supra note 30, at 30.
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kan environment after the Exxon Valdez spill.8 16 In fact, it has been esti-
mated that mechanical skimming, no* the most common cleanup
method, removes only ten to twenty percent of spilled oil.817
Third, the cleanup chemicals and the cleaning procedures could
themselves constitute environmental problems, in some cases to most
damaging dimensions. For instance, the Torrey Canyon oil spill was said
to have caused negligible damage to fisheries. Instead, it was found that
the kerosene and aromatic hydrocarbon-based dispersants used in the
cleanup caused the real damage.""
One final reason why the operators should prefer a prevention strat-
egy is that many of the actions that follow an oil spill such as cleanup,
negotiations, litigation, subsequent payment of compensation, restoration
of the polluted environment, and adverse publicity are usually more
costly and time consuming than prevention.
1 9
C. Tools
Given the above discussion, it is pertinent at this point to consider
which tool, or combination of tools, should be adopted by governments to
regulate the oil industry, particularly as it relates to environmental water
pollution. Generally, several different tools are employed by environmen-
tal statutes to ensure the realization of their objectives, s0 but for pur-
poses of this paper the choice is restricted to the command-and-control
mechanism and to the use of economic incentives.
Command-and-control standards refer to regulations issued by a gov-
ernment to prescribe the level of pollutant that a facility may emit. The
standards are either 1) performance-based, which set ambient-quality
levels, or 2) technology-based, which control discharges based on techno-
logical feasibility. In other words, the command-and-control strategy reg-
ulates by specifying certain goals which must be met in order to engage in
316. Michael J. Uda, supra note 131, at 403 n.2.
317. Slick Solutions to an Environmental Scourge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1993, at 3.11.
See also J.D. Kingham, Oil Spill Chemicals: Environmental Implications and Use Policy,
in The Petroleum Industry and the Nigerian Environment, supra note 4, 179 (stating that
regardless of any action taken after a major oil spill has occurred, the environment will
suffer some damage and that it is likely that a sizable fraction of the spilled oil will remain
even where the best cleaning hardware and expertise have been used); Adewumi & Ertekin,
supra note 2, at 160 (concluding that none of the cleaning methods is a panacea for getting
rid of the spilled oil but may only help to minimize the impact of the oil spill on the
environment).
318. C.T.I. Odu, Degradation and Weathering of Crude Oil Under Tropical Condi-
tions, in THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 4, at 144. See also THE CONTROL OF OIL
POLLUTION, supra note 15, at 58 (pointing out that "cleaning procedures probably cause as
much concern among biologists as the oily pollutants themselves and in some cases cleaning
increases damage to shore life").
319. For instance, the Exxon Valdez spill caused Exxon over $2 billion in cleanup costs
and well over $6 billion in penalties and damages thus far. 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 1155 (1994).
320. For an overview of the various legal tools including their effectiveness and defects,
see CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL, supra note 19, at 129-146.
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a polluting activity. 1s The prescribed measures are usually cost-oblivious.
On the other hand, the use of economic incentives places emphasis
on cost and price mechanisms. It involves the cost-benefit analysis,
residual charges (e.g. special taxes, effluent or emission fees), 22 tax de-
ductions or subsidies for purchase of pollution abatement equipment, etc.
The cost-benefit system supports the adoption of environmental protec-
tion measures only when the benefits from such measures outweigh their
costs.
The choice of a tool for the regulation of water pollution by oil
should depend on the goals of the regulations. The objectives should, at a
minimum, include the protection of public health, fishing, other marine
organisms, navigation, recreation, and aesthetics. As shown above,8"8 oil
pollution of water endangers all of these interests, but the most critical is
public health, particularly in Nigeria where untreated surface and ground
waters serve the domestic needs of most Nigerians.82 4
Where public health considerations are involved, as in the case of
water pollution by oil, the usual approach has been to enact measures
aimed at protecting the public health without regard to other factors such
as cost or whether the technology exists to effect the regulation." 8 This
approach is reflected in many U.S. environmental statutes, including
some of those regulating the oil and gas industry. 26 It has, predictably,
been the subject of severe criticism by the oil industry, which charges
that the regulations impose a high economic burden wholly unrelated to
whatever the regulations' benefits might be.32 7 But subjecting regulations
321. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Frame-
work, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1264 (1981).
322. For example, under current practices in Nigeria, oil producers are allowed to flare
associated gas on the payment of a penalty of 50 kobo (2.27 cents) per 1,000 cubic feet (the
charge until about 1992 was 2 kobo per 1,000 cubic feet). Associated Gas Reinjection
(Amendment) Act 1985.
323. See supra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 39 and 48-50 and accompanying text.
325. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 281, at 146-47. See also South Terminal Corp. v.
E.P.A., 504 F.2d 646, 675 (1st Cir. 1974) (Judge Campbell remarking that "minimum public
health requirements are often, perhaps usually, set without consideration of other economic
impact"); Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-Opening of the Environ-
mental Mind?, Wis. L. REV. 463, 508 (1989) (observing that a number of environmental laws
"emphasize ethical over economic values insofar as they aim to protect health, safety and
environmental quality, rather than to make markets more efficient or to maximize consumer
surplus or social wealth").
326. The OPA, the CWA, and the Clean Air Act are good examples of the command-
and-control type of legislation. Such health-based standards can, of course, be found in stat-
utes regulating other industries, e.g., the Delaney Clause of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(C)(3)(A). The clause prohibited the use of carcinogenic chem-
icals in foods despite the claims that the benefits of the practice outweighed the risks. W.H.
Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decision-
making, 4 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 191, 192 (1980).
327. H.B. Scoggins, Jr., President of Independent Petroleum Association of America
compared the mass of legislation and regulations on the oil industry with going after a mos-
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which seek to protect public health to some form of economic analysis has
its own problems. First, the cost-benefit analysis is not entirely objective;
it is, to some extent, a subjective value judgment. Further, it measures
only the economic efficiency of alternative actions while ignoring critical
moral and aesthetic concerns. 2 Some of these concerns cannot be ade-
quately expressed in monetary terms. When a human life is at stake,
moral factors, more than any other consideration, should dominate deci-
sion making.8 29
Laws and regulations which seek to protect Nigerian waters from oil
should adopt the command-and-control approach and ignore the concerns
about the cost and the possibility of harming the development of the pe-
troleum industry by discouraging investment.3 0 The need to protect the
health of Nigerians who rely on these waters should clearly override all of
these concerns. The role of oil in Nigeria's economy is recognized, but
investment and economic prosperity should not be attained at the ex-
pense of a large segment of the population.3 1 The experiences of other
quito with a shotgun and stated that "it's just not necessary." INT'L PETROLEUM ENCYCLOPE-
DIA 26 (1990). On his part, the chairman of the International Association of Independent
Tanker Owners, Andreas Ugland, criticized the U.S. liability laws as being so stringent that
given a situation where an oil tanker in U.S. waters were to hit a passenger ship or run
aground and cause a spill, the liability scheme made "accidentally killing 2,000 people on
the passenger ship the better choice." 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 2867 (1993). Ken Derr, Chairman of
Chevron, also lamented the regulatory scheme which he said was leading the loss of jobs in
the oil industry. "The upstream half of the industry has been devastated. The downstream
half is coming under enormous financial pressure. In both cases, the root cause is not eco-
nomic factors, not technical factors, but political or regulatory factors .... INT'L PETRO-
LEUM ENCYCLOPEDIA 192 (1993). But a recent study by the Economic Policy Institute (Jobs
and the Environment: The Myth of a National Trade-Off, 1995) disputes the claims that
environmental protection leads to job losses; rather, it found that environmental protection
raises employment levels. 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 1745 (1995).
328. Rodgers, Jr., supra note 326, at 194-95.
329. Questions have been raised about the moral propriety and the practicability of
placing monetary values on human lives and other intangible goods. Rodgers, supra note
326 at 197; Kirschten, Can Government Place a Value on Saving a Human Life?, NAT'L J.
252 (1979); Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and
Environmental Regulatory Decision-making, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473 (1980).
330. B.A. Osuno, Impact of Oil Industry on the Environment, in Proceedings of Envi-
ronmental Awareness Seminar For National Policy Makers, Lagos 51, 57 (1982). See also
Omobolaji Adewale, Environmental Pollution in the Petroleum Industry, 12 JUST. 9 (1991)
(expressing fears that adoption of high environmental standards might discourage the devel-
opment of the petroleum industry in Nigeria).
331. See Akanle, supra note 163, at 18. Nigeria no doubt is in need of development, but
it should equally be interested in protecting the environment and the health of her citizens.
Most developing countries have been faced with the cruel choice between environmental
quality and development. The losers in these conflicts between environmental quality and
development are usually those who suffer more than their fair share of the health, property,
and ecosystem damage costs of pollution. See World Comm'n on Environment and Develop-
ment, Our Common Future 48 (1987). In the case of the oil industry in Nigeria, the losers
have obviously been the oil-producing communities who have been made to bear far more
than their fair share of the burden of Nigeria's reliance on oil. But environmental quality
and development are not necessarily mutually exclusive; they can co-exist under the princi-
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developing countries, which placed premium on investment, employment,
and economic development over safety and environmental concerns,
should serve as lessons for Nigeria. Worth recalling is the 1984 tragic in-
dustrial accident in Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, blamed in part
on weak regulations and lax enforcement machinery, which killed over
3,300 people and maimed over 200,000 people for life.-"2 Nigeria should
not wait for the deaths and injuries from water pollution by oil to reach
such catastrophic proportions before acting. The time to act is now.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to enhance the protection of the waters from oil and its
products and wastes, the following recommendations are put forward in
addition to others already noted in the foregoing sections. Some are also
being merely restated here for clarity and emphasis. The recommenda-
tions, unless otherwise stated, apply to Nigeria.
a) The law should impose more detailed and realistic standards in-
cluding the outright banning of discharges of oil, its products and wastes
into, at least, inland waters in view of the uses to which these waters are
put, and setting stringent limits for offshore waters.
b) The law should set deadlines for compliance with its mandates by
all affected.
c) The confusion, created by Section 23 of the FEPA Act, over which
agency has authority to regulate the petroleum industry should be
cleared. It is suggested that both FEPA and the Department of Petro-
leum Resources should be vested with authority, but the problem of oil
pollution in Nigeria requires concerted actions and pooling of resources.
d) The regulatory agencies should be removed substantially from
ministerial control under which they currently operate. They should be
able to enact and enforce regulations without reference to a minister in
order to minimize political influences and red tape.
e) The scope of the FEPA Act should be expanded to cover not only
"waters of Nigeria," but all waters in Nigeria.
f) The defenses allowed under the Oil in Navigable Waters Act
should be significantly curtailed.
pies of sustainable development which ensure that development takes place to meet the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs. See the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 874
(1992), adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the
"Earth Summit") in June 1992 at Rio de Janeiro. For an examination of the dilemma be-
tween development and environmental quality and the concept of sustainable development,
see LAKSHMAN GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER
306-320, 924-929 (1994).
332. See generally C.M. Abraham & Sushila Abraham, The Bhopal Case and the De-
velopment of Environmental Law in India, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 334 (1991); Meera
Nanda, Waiting for Justice-Union Carbide's Legacy in Bhopal, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR
15 (July/August 1991).
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g) The law should raise the liability of polluters to include civil or
administrative penalties and damages for loss of subsistence, including
impairment of earning capacity.
h) Statutory provisions should be incorporated to allow for private
right of action by victims and for citizen suits.
i) Liability of polluters for payment of damages to victims should be
based on strict liability, with the recognized exceptions of acts of God,
acts of war and, within a restricted scope, acts of third parties. s 83
j) An oil spill liability trust fund similar to that under the U.S.'s
OPA should be adopted in Nigeria. The initial amount, probably less
than the $1 billion mark set by OPA, should be raised through an alloca-
tion by the Federal Government and taxes on every barrel of oil produced
in Nigeria. Subsequently, all penalties and fines should be paid into the
fund.
k) The U.S.'s CWA should extend the traditional defenses of acts of
God, acts of war, and acts of third parties to liability for civil or adminis-
trative penalties.
1) The U.S. law on the subject should be streamlined to minimize the
confusion and uncertainty that characterize the present law."' This may
mean preemption of certain state laws.
m) For both the U.S. and Nigeria, the focus should shift to spill pre-
vention, away from response and liability.
n) More appropriately for Nigeria, the agencies should rise to the
challenge of faithfully and conscientiously enforcing the statutes and reg-
ulations. In this regard, considerable efforts and resources should be de-
voted to the training of monitoring and enforcement officers and the ac-
quisition of basic working equipment.3 3 5
(o) The home governments of the transnational oil corporations and
oil consumer nations should become seriously involved in the conditions
under which oil is produced and bring pressure to bear on corporations to
enhance these conditions. Such home governments could require their
resident corporations to observe stipulated minimum environmental stan-
dards in their operations in foreign countries. The developed nations
should assist the developing countries in defending the right of all peo-
ples to safe and sufficient drinking water. 86
333. The imposition of strict liability for oil pollution damage seems to be the current
trend and is reflected in recent environmental statutes applying to oil pollution, e.g., U.S.
OPA, United Kingdom's Merchant Shipping (Salvage and Pollution) Act, 1994.
334. Preemption of state laws, however, seems unlikely at least for now. See supra
notes 251-252 and accompanying text.
335. Akanle, supra note 163, at 28.
336. In the Mar del Plata Action Plan adopted by the United Nations Water Confer-
ence in 1977, the international community accepted as a basic premise that "all peoples,
whatever their stage of development and their social and economic conditions, have the
right to have access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality equal to their basic
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VII. CONCLUSION
This article's comparison of the laws and policies of the United
States and Nigeria, dealing with oil pollution of water, reveals a yawning
gap in approach, commitment, and effectiveness between the two coun-
tries. The American approach includes detailed regulatory standards, a
tough enforcement scheme, and broad citizen participation rights. These
attributes have no equivalent in Nigeria. Instead, Nigeria chose a differ-
ent course, marked largely by discretion, informality and almost total in-
difference to the profound detriment of the environment and the people.
It is, however, desired that a new spirit of changes in Nigeria, signalled by
the Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act of 1988, will be kept
alive and that Nigerian law can be redirected along the lines suggested in
this article, implemented with greater intensity and dedication for the en-
during benefit of the Nigerian environment and the well-being of its
people.
needs." See The Report of the United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata, 14-25
March, 1977 U.N. Sales No. E.77 II.A.12, pt. one, ch.1, resolution II.
VOL. 24:1
